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THE NEW PHOENIX: MAINE’S INNOVATIVE 
STANDARDS FOR GUARDIANS AD LITEM 
Dana E. Prescott* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a 2014 article in the Maine Law Review, I took the opportunity to address the 
historical and legal foundation for guardian ad litem (GAL) appointments in Maine.1  
The article itself was written on the heels of a tumultuous political and policy 
discussion over the preceding few years concerning the qualifications, role, 
authority, and efficacy of GALs.  And this debate is not just a Maine event but one 
which has drawn the attention of scholars, stakeholders, and judicial authorities 
across the country.2  A common theme in the literature is the scope, authority, and 
accountability of a GAL when appointed to investigate and advocate for a child’s 
best interests—as defined by state law—when there is a claim of jeopardy by the 
state,3 parental conflict impedes a collaborative parenting plan in a child custody 
case,4 or the choices of the parents have implicated third party rights as biological, 
                                                                                                     
 * Dana E. Prescott, Esq. is licensed to practice law in Maine and Massachusetts, a partner at 
Prescott, Jamieson, & Murphy Law Group, LLC, a Fellow of the International Academy of Family Law 
and American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, and holds an MSW and a PhD in social work.  He is a 
rostered Guardian ad litem and currently serves as Chair of the Maine GAL Review Board.  The views 
expressed in this article are his alone and do not represent the opinions of any other organization or 
persons.  Mr. Prescott may be contacted at danap@maine.rr.com. 
 1. Dana E. Prescott, Inconvenient Truths: Facts and Frictions in Defense of Guardians Ad Litem for 
Children, 67 ME. L. REV. 43 (2014). The original GAL Rules, effective September 1, 2015, may be found 
at http://www.courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/text/mr_gal_only_2016-10-5.pdf.  Following 
the initial draft of this article, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, after a period for public comment, 
amended the GAL Rules effective October 1, 2016, 
http://www.courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/amendments/2016_mr_7_gal.pdf.  
 2. For a sampling of philosophies, see Katherine Hunt Federle & Danielle Gadomski, The Curious 
Case of the Guardian Ad Litem, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 337, 352 (2010) (“The idea that a child must have 
a guardian ad litem is a curious one.  For good or ill, we have an adversarial legal system. We strongly 
embrace the belief that the clashing presentation of stories from each of the parties will uncover the 
truth.”); Raven C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian Ad Litem in Child Custody Cases: 
The Contours of Our Judicial System Stretched Beyond Recognition, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 255, 306 
(1997) (“Elimination of the term and figure of the guardian ad litem will help move family law into the 
mainstream of legal thought and will permit better protection of the rights and interests of children and 
parents.”); Sheila M. Murphy, Guardians Ad Litem: The Guardian Angels of Our Children in Domestic 
Violence Court, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 281, 287 (1998) (“The need for guardians ad litem is particularly 
necessary in custody, visitation, and parentage litigation.”). 
 3. See Jean Koh Peters, How Children Are Heard in Child Protective Proceedings in the United 
States and Around the World in 2005: Survey Findings, Initial Observations, and Areas for Further Study, 
6 NEV. L.J. 966, 968-69 (2005) (“Nevertheless, the United States jurisdictions appear to be caught between 
two forces pulling in opposite directions: (1) a 1974 federal funding statute, the Child Abuse Prevention 
and Treatment Act (CAPTA) which has created an (unfunded) mandate linking funding for state child 
protective systems to the provision of a guardian ad litem for every child subject to child protective 
proceedings; and (2) a strengthening consensus among the academic and professional community that 
child representation should be conducted by lawyers acting in accordance with legal ethical rules and 
performing lawyerly functions.”).  
 4. See Margaret E. Sjostrom, What’s a GAL to Do?: The Proper Role of Guardians Ad Litem in 
Disputed Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 24 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 2 (2004) (“GAL roles generally 
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psychological, or de facto parents.5  
But that commonality does little to answer the critical question so often asked 
by the public: why appoint a GAL when we have judges to decide cases after a 
conventional trial?  The corollary heard in many lawyers’ offices is that “if a judge 
just hears what I have to say then he or she will know the truth and I will get my 
way.”  What is misunderstood, or ignored too often even by lawyers and 
professionals who should know better, is that the Western tradition of an adversarial 
system does not permit a judge to do more than hear evidence in a courtroom under 
rules and laws enacted many generations ago.  There is no authority for a judge to 
visit a living room, or confer privately with a therapist, or meet teachers and 
neighbors and family members outside the courtroom and without the rudiments and 
tensions of cross-examination.  Consequently, a stranger to that family, vested with 
constitutional authority and donning a robe, must divine a result from evidence 
proffered in a matter of hours amidst the rituals and ethical constraints of a 
courtroom.  The outcome of conflict between parents is thereby subject not just to 
rules and rituals, but the intellectual and emotional skill and persuasiveness of the 
lawyers or the parents, if self-represented.6  
The GAL role is intended by policy makers to fill this gap by acquiring 
information through investigation and inquiry outside the courtroom and then 
transferring that knowledge, by report and testimony, to judicial fact finding and 
decision making.  In practice, however, the same limitations are inherent.  The weight 
of the GAL investigation and its authority are subject to the human variables of the 
adversarial system, including the judge’s filter of experience, belief matrices, and 
                                                                                                     
fall into one of three main categories: advocate for the child’s wishes (advocate), champion of the child’s 
best interests (champion), or factfinder for the court (factfinder).”); see also Miller v. Miller, 677 A.2d 
64, 70 (Me. 1996) (“In our view, the use of guardians ad litem to protect the best interests of children in 
divorce proceedings fully satisfies any federal constitutional requirements.”).  
 5. As Maine was passing these new rules for GALs, a new UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT became law, 
L.D. 1017 (127th Legis. 2015).  Concurrently, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, 
has had to resolve an ever-evolving and complex intersection of constitutional and statutory matrix of 
family relationships. See Curtis v. Medeiros, 2016 ME 180, ¶ 18, ___ A.3d ___ (“Consistent with the 
minimum procedural requirements we have announced as safeguards on the fundamental right to parent, 
we conclude that before a court may grant a third party contact with a child pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 
1653(2)(B), the third party must file both a motion to intervene in the matter and his or her own motion 
seeking such contact.”); In re Guardianship of Hailey M., 2016 ME 80, ¶ 29, 140 A.3d 478 (“Based on 
the evidence presented, the court created a full guardianship in the child’s grandparents to establish a 
stable living situation for a then fifteen-year-old child whose interactions with her mother exacerbated the 
risk that the child would injure herself or run away.”); Dorr v. Woodard, 2016 ME 79, ¶ 28, 140 A.3d 467 
(“The question is whether the State has the authority, on the facts presented by Dorr, to intrude on the 
mother’s decision-making on behalf of her daughter.”); Kilborn v. Carey, 2016 ME 78, ¶ 14, 140 A.3d 
461 (“The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child’s life would be substantially and 
negatively affected by Kilborn’s absence and that Kilborn had satisfied his burden of showing that he is 
the child’s de facto parent.”).  
 6. See Linda L. Berger, How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A 
Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 259, 286 (2008) (“Symbols and setting further support the character of the trial judge in 
the custody narrative.  The judge’s elevated bench, the robe, and the gavel match the role of listening, 
questioning, and making authoritative, objective statements.  The physical location of the lawyers and 
litigants, on the stage but below the judge, situates them to present a contest.  The courtroom itself may 
physically appear to be a setting of authority, reason, and truth finding.”). 
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judgment.7 
The failure of the legal system to explain the basic obligations and duties of the 
judiciary as a constitutional branch of government is most regrettable.8  As a 
consequence of decades of civic neglect, the public may become even more cynical 
about a trial process which resembles membership in a secret society.9  The breadth 
of that criticism, however, is not the same as ignoring that, with the freedom to 
choose a parent in a democracy, come the consequences of that choice.  Long before 
the authority of the judicial system is invoked to enter judgments allocating a child 
between parents, these same parents have a right to create a safe home, to be kind 
and gracious to each other, and to give their child the benefits of sacrifice and 
stability.  
Nevertheless, GAL roles must be organized and reformed within the traditional 
confines of a centuries-old adversarial system.10  This point requires very careful 
understanding because laws and rules may change GAL qualifications and 
accountability but not the rituals or core operating system of the American judicial 
system.  Under such circumstances, the public may perceive that nothing has 
changed at all because the visible reality of the judicial process remains the same.  
As well-articulated by Judge Gerald W. Hardcastle: 
In determining whether the adversarial process has any appropriate application to 
the modern family court, the issue previously raised is whether matters involving 
families ought to continue to be handled in courts at all.  Presently, lawyers and 
judges in family courts are taking a beating.  Fundamental role changes are 
demanded.  For example, attorneys are demanded to shift their roles from zealous 
                                                                                                     
 7. See In re Adoption of T.D., 2014 ME 36, ¶ 18, 87 A.3d 726 (“Indeed, often the most effective 
challenge to the quality, completeness, or competence of a GAL’s work will be accomplished through 
cross-examination of the GAL at trial. If a parent or other interested party has filed a motion to remove 
the GAL or otherwise challenging the GAL’s investigations, the court can, and should, hear the motion 
during the trial and allow examination of the GAL on the pertinent issues.  If the court concludes that the 
investigation has been insufficient or that the GAL has demonstrated a bias that has made the GAL’s 
testimony unreliable, the court may disregard that testimony in whole or in part.”).  
 8. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1100 
(2006) (“We constantly recite the deep truth that the courts depend on public confidence, but we must do 
more to educate the public about the role of the courts.”). 
 9. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional 
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 208 (1943) (“The question may be asked whether the 
lawyer can be held responsible in any significant degree for the plight in which we find ourselves.  For a 
moralist, the question is whether the lawyer can be ‘blamed’; for a scientist, whether he is an important 
causal variable; for a reformer, whether he can be acted upon to produce change.  The answer to all of 
these questions is: most assuredly, yes.”).  For those who may speed read like me, look at the date of the 
article.  
 10. Commentary related to reforming the civil system and more specific criticism of the lack of a 
unified family court system has been the source of much literature.  See Barbara A. Babb, Where We 
Stand: An Analysis of America’s Family Law Adjudicatory Systems and the Mandate to Establish Unified 
Family Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 31, 37 (1998) (“As early as 1959, then, with the publication of the Standard 
Family Court Act, policymakers offered a valuable court reform proposal structured to allow one court 
the opportunity to consider and resolve all of a family’s related legal problems.  Drafters of the Act 
foresaw the expertise of the judges sitting in this court, and the social services available to the families, 
as necessary features to improve the lives of individuals and families.”); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary 
System: Dinosaur or Phoenix?, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (discussing reform of the adversarial civil court 
system).  
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advocate to “counselor,” from “guard dog” to “guide dog.”  In spite of the fact the 
vast majority of cases under the adversarial system settle, the effort is to paint 
attorneys as advocates who care only for the heat of the courtroom battle.11 
A final point before moving onto the body of this Article:  although specific 
demographics are beyond its scope, it is critical to understand that modern family 
systems may be subject to even more complex forms of child custody litigation as 
“family scripts” rapidly divide, adapt, and re-configure throughout the life of a child.  
The law attempts, as best such a blunt instrument may do, to respect and balance 
changing societal mores and values.12  Courts and GALs are a function of these shifts, 
not a cause, but—and it is a critical “but”—the “power framework” for all 
constitutional branches of government and family courts must eventually adjust to 
these societal evolutions.13   
II.  HIGH STAKES AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF MAINE FAMILY COURTS 
In fairness, these cases are high stakes for parents and children.  As such, in the 
realm of concrete rather than emotive expectations, the public is entitled to 
accountability in response to any policy design which delegates power to a third party 
to summarize someone’s life by investigating and recommending.  What are the 
credentials, training, and ethical duties of that GAL?  How will the investigative and 
authoritative role of that GAL influence the judge and the outcome in court?  Will 
my concerns with violence and abuse, control and coercion, or economic and 
emotional dominance be heard objectively?  Will my life and family be viewed with 
cultural and personal respect and dignity?  These are legitimate and relevant 
questions which require a collaborative and thoughtful response from all three 
branches of government in conjunction with interdisciplinary professionals, 
stakeholders, and diverse families. 
As the passage of time yielded reflection and perspective, GALs, like trial judges 
and magistrates, were an easily accessible target.14  Unlike other institutions which 
                                                                                                     
 11. Gerald W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court Judge’s 
Perspective, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y  57, 100-01 (2005) (footnotes omitted).  
 12. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE 
AMERICAN FAMILY 90 (2014) (“It is time to recognize that family scripts have been rewritten, and they 
have been rewritten along the diverging lines of gender, class, and culture.  Marriage is thriving among 
higher-income, well-educated men and women who have become more likely to stay together; marriage 
is dying among lower-income, less-educated men and women, and the marriages they do enter into are 
more likely to end in divorce.”).  
 13. Id. at 186 (“The debate over family values—and their legal expression—proceeds as though 
financial and child custody laws are independent of the power framework in which the rules are to be 
implemented.  We have argued throughout this book that they are not.”).  Arguing about a political or 
personal preference is not the same as recognizing the reality of what is rather than what ought to be.  See 
Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 10, 90 A.3d 1169 (“For some time now, we and other courts have been 
considering the law of parentage in light of advancements in technology, changes in social norms and 
family structures, and the resulting ever-expanding list of legal issues relating to children and families.”). 
 14. This risk was a part of the republic from its inception.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism 
and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 
1279, 1293 (2005) (“Although the Framers of the Constitution did not anticipate our modem pluralism, 
they appreciated the fragility of democracy when the ‘stakes’ of politics get too high. Stakes get high 
when the system becomes embroiled in bitter disputes that drive salient, productive groups away from 
engagement in pluralist politics.  Groups will disengage when they believe that participation in the system 
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may disperse responsibility, the judiciary and GALs were easily identifiable to 
individuals whose frustration ranged from failure to receive legitimate and insightful 
advocacy for positive change to the pathologies of blame and invective.  The 
challenge of preventing the extremes on either side from leaving families and family 
courts in ashes was rather daunting and, for a time, it was unclear whether anything 
positive could survive much less thrive.15  As we shall explore more precisely in the 
sections below, the Phoenix survived because honorable people, across branches of 
government and professions and personal experience, eventually prevailed such that 
innovative rules arose from innovative statutes.16 
A.  The Family Court Division 
By way of a brief foray into recent history, Maine enacted its “Family Division” 
in 1997, effective in 1998, with the following directive:  
The Family Division shall provide a system of justice that is responsive to the needs 
of families and the support of their children.  The Maine Supreme Judicial Court 
may adopt administrative orders and court rules governing the practice, procedure 
and administration of the Family Division.  These practices and procedures must 
include, but are not limited to, education for the parties, case management and 
referral services to mediation and other alternate dispute resolution technique.17 
The Maine District Court is not a family court with a singular unified docket or 
single judge case management system in the sense that those terms are used by other 
state courts that only hear cases dedicated to families.18 
Before and after 1998, district courts must hear and decide civil matters 
involving foreclosures, landlord-tenants, small claims, and all matter of other 
disputes.19  And the district court also must hear and decide traffic offenses, criminal 
                                                                                                     
is pointless due to their permanent defeat on issues important to them or their perception that the process 
is stacked against them, or when the political process imposes fundamental burdens on them or threatens 
their group identity or cohesion.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 15. Reid J. Meloy, Indirect Personality Assessment of the Violent True Believer, 82 J. PERSONALITY 
ASSESSMENT 138 (2004) (“Eric Hoffer (1951), who captured an essential psychodynamic of the true 
believer when he wrote in 1951, ‘The vanity of the selfless, even those who practice utmost humility, is 
boundless[.]’”). 
 16. The use of myth or metaphor to try and capture the influences of change in the judicial system is 
not new.  See Linda H. Edwards, Once upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L. 
REV. 883, 890 (2010) (“Myths provide ready templates for plots.  Myths and narrative archetypes such as 
birth, death, re-birth, journey and sacrifice establish a particular view, a narrative perspective on the events 
of a story, creating the context in which ideas or events will be interpreted.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 17. 4 M.R.S.A. § 183 (2016). 
 18. For an extensive and insightful review of the history and policies which created multiple track 
systems for children in Maine, see Deirdre M. Smith, From Orphans to Families in Crisis: Parental Rights 
Matters in Maine Probate Courts, 68 ME. L. REV. 45, 47-48 (2016) (“Maine’s split jurisdiction system, 
perhaps unique in the country, precludes coordination and consolidation of matters involving the same 
child in the Family Division of the Maine District Court and a county probate court—a judge in one court 
system cannot adopt, modify, or terminate an order from the other system.  This common scenario leads 
to confusion, conflicting orders, inefficiencies, and additional stress on a child and family that are already 
in crisis.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 19. For a comprehensive and long list, see 4 M.R.S.A. § 152 (2016). 
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charges when imprisonment is less than a year, and all juvenile matters.20  The public 
rarely understands that Maine’s notion—and funding—of a family court system is a 
sub-set of much larger operational responsibilities of the Administrative Office of 
the Courts and the Chief Justice.  
Maine did enact a family law magistrate system to help facilitate case 
management and interim hearings in divorce and parental rights cases.21  This hiring 
of magistrates as adjudicators is unique to Maine because the Governor does not 
nominate magistrates, nor does the Legislature hold hearings and consent to their 
appointment as is the constitutional requirement for all Maine judges.22  Instead, the 
Chief Judge of the District Court, with the approval of the Chief Justice of the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court, shall employ the magistrates.23  Magistrates then “serve at 
the pleasure of the Chief Judge of the District Court.”24  
Unlike magistrates appointed in the family division, the appointment of a district 
court judge does not require any family law practice or training of any kind, nor any 
expertise in the areas described below.25  The Maine judiciary does provide intra-
office trainings and judges frequently attend continuing education and other 
educational opportunities and many judges work diligently to acquire that 
knowledge. By comparison, the Legislature required that magistrates have 
experience in family law, as well as “interest, training or experience in mediation 
and other alternate dispute resolution techniques, domestic violence, child 
development, family dynamics and case management.”26  Of note, GALs are 
required to have similar forms of experience, as well as meet continuing education 
and licensure requirements under the GAL Rules.27  
                                                                                                     
 20. 4 M.R.S.A. § 165 (2016).  The implementation of the Unified Criminal Docket has altered some 
of these roles as District Court Judges sit in Superior Court to conduct jury trials and pretrial criminal 
procedures, such as motions to suppress, are heard in the Superior Court.  
 21. See 4 M.R.S.A. § 183 (2016); Me. R. Civ. P. 100 et seq. (2016).  
 22. See Me. Const. art. V, § 8 (“The Governor shall nominate, and, subject to confirmation as 
provided herein, appoint all judicial officers, except judges of probate and justices of the peace if their 
manner of selection is otherwise provided for by this Constitution or by law, and all other civil and military 
officers whose appointment is not by this Constitution, or shall not by law be otherwise provided for.”).  
The exception relates to the election of Probate Judges which has had its critics and supporters for decades.  
See In re Estate of McCormick, 2001 ME 24, ¶ 16, 765 A.2d 552 (“The practice of allowing part-time 
probate judges to litigate cases as part-time lawyers has received widespread criticism” in various 
commission reports thereafter set forth.); Smith, supra note 18. 
 23. 4 M.R.S.A. § 183(1) (2016). 
 24. 4 M.R.S.A. § 183(1)(C) (2016). 
 25. See Herma Hill Kay, A Family Court: The California Proposal, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1205, 1205 
(1968) (“The idea of a family court has been discussed for many years.  Such a court, it is said, should 
have integrated jurisdiction over all legal problems that involve the members of a family; be presided over 
by a specialist judge assisted by a professional staff trained in the social and behavioral sciences; and 
employ its special resources and those of the community to intervene therapeutically in the lives of the 
people who come before it.”).  Again, the date of this article proves a point.   
 26. 4 M.R.S.A. § 183(1)(A) (2016).  
 27. See M.R.G.A.L. 2(b)(2)(B) (“The applicant must have attended a guardian ad litem training 
program approved by the Chief Judge with a curriculum of at least 18 hours to be placed on the Title 18-
A and/or 19-A Roster and 23 hours for the Title 22 Roster.  To be approved by the Chief Judge, the 
training curriculum must include specified learning outcomes and activities designed to meet those 
outcomes, and must cover Titles 18-A, 19-A, and 22; dynamics of domestic abuse and its effect on 
children; dynamics of separation and divorce and their effect on children; child development; timing and 
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Now, to be very clear, this does not mean that district court judges do not 
perform this role with dedication and commitment to families.  Many do and many 
who never had family law practice experience perform these complex duties with 
honor and integrity over long careers.  What this does mean, however, is that the 
public expects family court judges (whether unfairly or irrationally) to possess 
knowledge and experience merged with an intellectual rigor, wisdom, sagacity, and 
temperament that few humans possess.28  Judges are not alone, of course.  The role 
of magistrates and GALs reflects a similar matrix of expectations.  In too many cases, 
however, children have no other avenue or resources because a child’s parent(s) has 
abdicated, by act or intent, the constitutional right to self-determination and 
autonomy.29 
B.  The Dearth of Research Informing Policy 
With that foundation, the frustration expressed about GALs reflects a broader 
national debate which is deeply, if subconsciously, rooted in the power and duty of 
“courts” in a democracy to preside over the most intimate and mundane of family 
behaviors.30  Whether in the form of child protection or child custody litigation, 
variations of inter-generational meiosis and mitosis implicate the very definition 
                                                                                                     
impact of court-related events from a child’s perspective; the effects of abuse, neglect, and trauma on 
children; substance abuse; mental health; family finance and the financial impact of separation and 
divorce; legal issues and processes; ethics and professionalism as a guardian ad litem; the duties and 
obligations of the guardian ad litem as an agent of the court; and interviewing techniques.”). 
 28. See Chad M. Oldfather, Judges as Humans: Interdisciplinary Research and the Problems of 
Institutional Design, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 127 (2007) (“However much we may understand, on an 
intellectual level, that judges are mere humans, we have a tendency to believe that somehow the process 
of becoming a judge effects a substantial transformation, and that judges become different from the rest 
of us.  At least implicitly, we impute near-magical properties to the acts of taking an oath and donning a 
black robe, as if they somehow eliminate one’s susceptibility to all the foibles, biases, and petty jealousies 
that are the stuff of day-to-day life.”) (footnote omitted).  
 29. See, e.g., Guardianship of Sebastien Chamberlain, 2015 ME 76, ¶ 33, 118 A.3d 229 (“To properly 
balance the constitutional rights at issue, an order appointing a guardian pursuant to section 5-204(d)—
like other orders that terminate or severely constrain the fundamental right to parent—can be entered only 
after a court has made findings applying the standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence.”); Light 
v. D’Amato, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 21, 105 A.3d 447 (“Because fundamental rights are at stake for a relocating 
parent, a nonrelocating parent, and a child, and because the court’s determination must be focused on the 
child’s best interest, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2013), a divorce judgment’s effect on a parent’s decision 
to relocate will not, per se, constitute a constitutional violation.”); Sparks v. Sparks, 2013 ME 41, ¶ 18, 
65 A.3d 1223 (“Concluding that the protection from abuse statute permits an award of temporary parental 
rights and responsibilities to nonparents responsible for an abused child, we review the statute to 
determine whether it infringes on Brant’s constitutional interests protected by the Due Process Clauses of 
the United States and Maine Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Me. Const. art. I, § 6-A.”).  
 30. The literature is vast but for thoughtful discussion, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing 
Children: The Ongoing Search for Clear and Workable Standards, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 183 
(2005); Marcia M. Boumil et al., Legal and Ethical Issues Confronting Guardian ad Litem Practice, 13 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43 (2011). 
2016] THE NEW PHOENIX 75 
of being a “parent”31 or a “family”32 which, in turn, implicates a complex matrix of 
socio-economic status, mental health struggles, substance abuse and addiction, 
personality and characterological traits, and domestic violence or neglect.  As these 
familial mutations separate and bind during iterations of litigation, family courts are 
inevitably placed in the midst of intimate family relationships—often for years upon 
years.33  
What professionals also know is that the dearth of methodologically-sound 
research concerning family court interventions means that much of child custody 
policy is, mostly, well-meaning guesswork.34  There is an historical trade-off with 
any governmental bureaucracy when social welfare policy is guided by good 
intentions, feelings, or intuition in that organizational preferences for efficiency may 
trump the most effective and equitable delivery of resources.  Yet this adversarial 
system, despite decades of explication, remains bound to traditions of truth-finding-
by-combat.  In family court, the adversarial system has an even more peculiar 
existence because a judgment is always subject to post-order bargaining, threats, and 
                                                                                                     
 31. For purposes of this Article, the term “parent” means the legal authority to make child-related 
decisions or have physical custody of a child.  See Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 10, 90 A.3d 1169 (“For 
some time now, we and other courts have been considering the law of parentage in light of advancements 
in technology, changes in social norms and family structures, and the resulting ever-expanding list of legal 
issues relating to children and families.”); Andrew L. Weinstein, The Crossroads of a Legal Fiction and 
the Reality of Families, 61 ME. L. REV. 319, 319 (2009) (“As much disagreement as may exist in the 
academic world, things in the judicial arena are hardly better.  Depending upon venue, the rules change, 
with at least as great a variety as will be found in the law journals.  Part of that variety is due to fundamental 
disagreement about policy, but part of it is also due to the judges’ inevitable sensitivity to the factual 
harmonics of each case, as a brief tour of recent case law will show.”). 
 32. See Andrew J. Cherlin, Demographic Trends in the United States: A Review of Research in the 
2000s, 72 J. MARRIAGE AND FAM. 403, 413-14 (2010) (“Cohabiting relationships may not have a clear 
beginning point.  Single parents and their adolescents often disagree on whether new, seemingly 
cohabiting partners are part of the family.  The crosshousehold ties that multiple partner fertility can create 
may lead to families without clear boundaries.”) (citation omitted); Sara McLanahan, Diverging 
Destinies: How Children are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 
607 (2004) (“How children are faring under the second demographic transition, which began around 1960, 
is less certain.  The primary trends of the second transition include delays in fertility and marriage; 
increases in cohabitation, divorce, and nonmarital childbearing; and increases in maternal employment.”).  
 33. Aggregating the data for filings—and which reveals only quantity, not complexity—is a difficult 
task because each state counts caseloads differently and various categories of cases may overlap, such as 
domestic violence complaints, child protection petitions, divorce, or parental rights, and post-judgment 
motions.  For a national description of the data, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 
http://www.ncsc.org/Services-and-Experts/Areas-of-expertise/Court-statistics.aspx.  The data for Maine 
may be found at STATE OF MAINE JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
http://www.courts.maine.gov/news_reference/stats/index.html.  
 34. See Neerosh Mudaly & Chris Goddard, The Ethics of Involving Children Who Have Been Abused 
in Child Abuse Research, 17 INT’L. J. CHILD. RTS. 261, 265 (2009) (“Our main intention in the research 
was to empower them by giving them an opportunity to have their voices heard.  On the other hand, of 
equal importance to us, was the need to protect them from any possible risk of harm from involvement in 
the research.”); Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody Disputes: From Fault 
Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 395, 413 
(2000) (“Opinions are plentiful, but hard data is not.  A recent comprehensive study on high conflict 
divorce cases by the Canadian Parliament, for example, bemoans the absence of data for policymakers 
and asks for an immediate program of empirical research on indicia of high conflict divorce including, 
false allegations of abuse and neglect; parental alienation; the behaviors, patterns, and dynamics of 
domestic violence and parental child abduction.”).  
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motions for modification and contempt throughout the minority of that child.  
Moreover, and unlike other practice areas, much more than half of all litigants 
are self-represented (as against child protection cases where there is a right to counsel 
paid by the state) at various times in the adversarial process.35  For all the decades of 
discussion and demographic shifts, the traditional method of getting relevant and 
evidence-informed research and data to judges still requires hurdling a complex array 
of rules of evidence as accessible as any Georgian chant in Latin (and sometimes that 
is true for lawyer-speak as well).36  
It is fair to state openly now that not only lay persons but some lawyers, 
mediators, psychologists, social workers, therapists, and psychiatrists expect such 
mythical skills when there should be better recognition of human and institutional 
frailty.  This does not mean that any organization should ignore the intrinsic duty to 
exercise the privilege of power and authority with the best ethical and scientific 
knowledge available.  Most try to do so.  The importance of meeting such a duty, 
however, should not obscure an unfettered truth about human nature: what is often 
disguised in social media and public hearings as vitriol/blame/rigid thinking is that a 
GAL is only appointed, and a judge only exercising that power, because parents do 
not settle those differences without an adversarial trial.  
This polite tweak before we begin to address refinement of statutes and rules, 
suggests that a shift from an adversarial system to some other form of decision 
making is a matter of public importance; not to be trivialized.37  Changing the 
institution of family courts in the United States may occur someday but that means 
a genuine paradigm shift, akin to Copernicus and Newton from Plato and Ptolemy, 
as to how Americans view the right to be right coupled with the  gravitational 
collapse of personal accountability.  Family courts, as an institutional remedy, are 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Marsha M. Mansfield & Louise G. Trubek, New Roles to Solve Old Problems: Lawyering for 
Ordinary People in Today’s Context, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 367, 370-71 (2011) (“Over the past twenty 
years, the American legal system has shifted from one where litigants were predominately represented by 
lawyers to one where self-represented litigants are most common.”) (footnotes omitted); Jessica Dixon 
Weaver, Overstepping Ethical Boundaries? Limitations on State Efforts to Provide Access to Justice in 
Family Courts, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2705, 2706-07 (2014) (“Challenges to lawyers’ monopoly of the 
legal system and the U.S. Supreme Court’s continuous rejection of a right to counsel in civil cases have 
led to the creation of many avenues for pro se legal assistance”). 
 36. In a more scholarly manner, colleagues from Maine have made this argument for years.  See John 
Sheldon & Peter Murray, Rethinking the Rules of Evidentiary Admissibility in Non-Jury Trials, 86 
JUDICATURE 227, 227 (2003) (“The illogic of this practice has been obvious to generations of scholars.”).  
I did not originally agree with my colleagues but I have evolved a different opinion driven by the volume 
of pro se litigants, the unfairness of poverty and allocation of resources, the risks to another generation of 
children, misuse of experts and science in family courts, and the correlative need for a different means to 
provide data to judges with some degree of ethical balance.  See Dana E. Prescott, Forensic Experts and 
Family Courts: Science or Privilege-by-License?, 28 J. AM. ACAD. MATR. LAW. 521 (2016).  
 37. See Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm?: Analyzing the Institutional Culture 
of Family Courts Through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 
55, 56 (2010) (“My thesis is that the institutional culture of family courts across the nation too often stifles 
conversation and innovation, muffles the voices of the disenfranchised, and serves as a disincentive for 
zealous legal advocacy.  The social psychology phenomenon known as ‘groupthink’ can be shown to be 
a contributing factor to this culture.”); Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving 
Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1061 (2003) (“Problem solving courts represent a significant new 
direction for the judiciary.  These judges seek to actively and holistically resolve both the judicial case 
and the problem that produced it.”) (footnote omitted).  
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necessary because the alternative is a vacuum in which human nature, operating 
through family and group systems, may enforce the right to be right by violence, 
aggression, or economic oppression. Until a better alternative is implemented (not 
just theorized) any new laws or rules must work within a real environment in real 
time and not just the realm of thought experiments.  
III.  THE CORE OF THE RULES 
For the most part, the political and policy discussion concerning GALs pertained 
to Title 19-A cases between private parties and, thereby, was disconnected from 
probate proceedings under Title 18-A or child abuse and neglect proceedings brought 
by the State under Title 22.38  In 2013, the Legislature sought and mandated more 
uniformity irrespective of the jurisdictional forum for appointing a GAL.39  Thus, 
“guardian ad litem” means “a person appointed as the court's agent to represent the 
best interests of one or more children pursuant to Title 18-A, section 1-112; Title 19-
A, section 1507; or Title 22, section 4005” and “best interests of the child” means 
“an outcome that serves or otherwise furthers the health, safety, well-being, 
education and growth of the child.”40  
In the spring and summer of 2015, the Supreme Judicial Court began receiving 
public comment on proposed GAL Rules, which included a new Review Board, 
under the auspices of the Board of Overseers of the Bar, to oversee and adjudicate 
ethical complaints.  Concomitantly, the Administrative Office of the Courts was 
developing a uniform GAL appointment order, as well as a training program for new 
GAL applicants which was sponsored by the Maine State Bar Association and held 
in October of 2015.41  Thus, all GALs must adhere to the same roster qualifications, 
ethical standards, and oversight under rules adopted by the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court effective September 1, 2015.42  In conformity with 4 M.R.S.A. § 1554(3)(A)-
                                                                                                     
 38. In 2016, the Legislature enacted, and the Governor signed, legislation entitled “An Act To Ensure 
a Continuing Home Court for Cases Involving Children,” L.D. 890 (127th Legis. 2016).  This legislation 
substantially altered the relationship between the Probate Courts and District Courts when a case involves 
rights and responsibilities for a child.  The unintended consequences of this legislation on existing GAL 
appointment orders and how district court judges construe Title 18-A of the Uniform Probate Code in 
District Court remains a work-in-progress.  
 39. See 4 M.R.S.A. § 1555(1) (2016) (In “proceedings to determine parental rights and responsibilities 
and guardianship of a minor under Title 18-A and in contested proceedings pursuant to Title 19-A, section 
904, 1653 or 1803 in which a minor child is involved, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the 
child when the court has reason for special concern as to the welfare of the child.”); 4 M.R.S.A. § 1556(1) 
(2016) (“An order appointing a guardian ad litem pursuant to Title 22, section 4005 must specify the terms 
and conditions of the appointment as provided in Title 22, this chapter and rules adopted by the Supreme 
Judicial Court.”). 
 40. 4 M.R.S.A. §§ 1551(1), (2) (2016).  Under a sunset provision, the chapter is repealed October 1, 
2017, pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 1558.  
 41. For this information, see http://www.courts.maine.gov/rules_adminorders/rules/index.shtml; 
http://mebaroverseers.org/regulation/gal_rules.html; FM-125, Rev. 09/15, 
http://www.courts.maine.gov/fees_forms/forms/index.shtml#fm.  
 42. See M.R.G.A.L. 1(a) (2016) (“These Rules are adopted pursuant to 4 M.R.S. §§ 1551 to 1557, 
18-A M.R.S. § 1-112, 19-A M.R.S. § 1507, and 22 M.R.S. § 4005, to address practice and performance 
of guardians ad litem for children in the District Court, the Superior Court, and the Probate Court.  They 
govern the qualifications for guardians ad litem, standards of conduct for guardians ad litem, appointment 
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(I), the court adopted M.R.G.A.L. 1 as core values for all GAL appointments: 
A guardian ad litem must tailor his or her work to the particular needs and 
circumstances of each case as identified in the court order appointing the guardian 
ad litem, but, in general, a guardian ad litem shall  
 
(1) Represent consistently the best interest of the child and provide information to 
the court that assists the court in determining the best interest of the child;  
 
(2) Understand and uphold the law and court orders related to the guardian ad litem’s 
appointment;  
 
(3) Maintain the highest standards of professionalism, cultural sensitivity, and 
ethics;  
 
(4) Recognize that timely resolution of each matter serves the best interest of the 
child and the child’s need for stability;  
 
(5) Within the scope of authority defined by statute or court order, plan, carry out, 
document, and complete thorough, appropriate, and fair investigations in a timely 
fashion;   
  
(6) Communicate in a developmentally appropriate way with the child;    
 
(7) Make well-reasoned and factually based recommendations regarding the best 
interest of the child as directed by the order of appointment;    
 
(8)  Pursuant to the order of appointment, include parties in the investigation, use 
effective communication techniques, recognize limitations that may be imposed by 
the financial resources of the parties as applicable, and be aware of the cultural and 
socioeconomic status of the parties; and  
 
(9) Complete assignments and written reports in a timely manner, and communicate 
effectively with the court in motions, reports, recommendations, and testimony.43   
As compared with other models nationally, the development and adoption of 
these rules represented a novel and more precise approach to GAL qualifications, 
supervision, training, and oversight.44  Common sense and years of experience with 
the frailties of newly designed policies suggests that what is being implemented 
today is subject, as it should be, to informed and intelligent evolution and 
amendment.  Of particular importance, this approach to GALs was not just a dirigo 
pivot but responsive to intensive public input and institutional discussion.45  Indeed, 
                                                                                                     
of guardians ad litem, and placement of guardians ad litem on, and removal of guardians ad litem from, 
the guardian ad litem Roster.”). 
 43. M.R.G.A.L. 1(b) (2016).  
 44. For a different approach but one which is comprehensive as well, see Massachusetts Probate and 
Family Court Standing Order 1-08: Standards for Guardians ad Litem/Evaluator, 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/case-legal-res/rules-of-court/probate/pfc-orders/1-08.html.  
 45. In other countries, policy design and implementation of interventions or programs in child 
protection and child custody would require iterative assessment and measurement.  See Eileen Munro & 
Alison Hubbard, A Systems Approach to Evaluating Organisational Change in Children’s Social Care, 
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the inherent policy objective was not just “muddling through”46 but the engagement 
of standards of practice so that parents and children receive the most equitable, 
efficient, and effective (not perfect) services from our family courts.  
It is, however, critical to understand, at the threshold, that Maine is a state which 
provides no public funding for GALs or any other intervention, including mental 
health evaluations or court-appointed counsel, in private child custody cases.47  This 
decades-old policy decision remains unchanged to date and it is unlikely that funding 
is on the horizon. This means that parents and children, and judges and magistrates 
deciding these cases, do not (and will not) have access to any independent 
professional services absent the families’ capacity to fund payment from personal or 
family resources.48  
The purpose of this section, therefore, is to highlight those aspects of the law 
and rules which are most relevant and in a manner as precise as the language of child 
custody law allows.  As such, we begin with qualifications, scope of appointments, 
duty and immunity, ethical obligations, report writing, and confidentiality, and the 
ever-adaptive duties of a GAL as investigator, advocate, conflict-mediator, 
recommender, report-giver, and expert opinion-witness.   
                                                                                                     
41 BRIT. J. OF SOC. WORK 726 (2011); Colleen Varcoe & Lori G. Irwin, “If I Killed You, I’d Get the 
Kids”: Women’s Survival and Protection Work with Child Custody and Access in the Context of Woman 
Abuse, 27 QUALITATIVE SOC. 77 (2004).  The judicial system in the United States is, however, rather 
opaque when it comes to research concerning the efficacy of GALs, psychological evaluations, parenting 
education, or mediation, for example. The reason this matters is that even “educated guesswork” fails to 
adequately explain to the public why an intervention is effective or whether it works across differences in 
race, social-economic status, culture, married or non-married status, or other variables: much less whether 
the intervention sustains positive change over the short, medium, and long runs. 
 46. This phrase has various complex meanings but may be traced to theories of policy analysis.  See 
Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959). When I teach 
graduate school programs in policy, I require students to consider two paradigms: Pareto Improvements 
and Rawls’ “veil of ignorance.” In my adaptive shorthand for social work, a Pareto Improvement, as 
developed by an Italian economist more than a century ago, is a change in policy which improves the lives 
of everyone but hurts no one.  See Robert Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control 
and Self-Improvement for the “Bad Man” of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903, 920 (1998) (“A Pareto 
improvement is a change that causes an increase in utility for at least one person without a decrease in the 
other’s utility.”).  Perhaps impossible to accomplish in real life but critical to analyzing any social welfare 
policy.  In JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), Rawls engaged in a thought experiment in which 
you consider what political system of economic and social justice you would want if you did not know 
whether you would be a master or slave or disabled or healthy, for example.  
 47. See Meyer v. Meyer, 414 A.2d 236, 238 (Me. 1980) (“In Karen Meyer’s proceeding for 
termination of his visitation rights, Mr. Meyer did not have a right to court-appointed counsel.”); Danforth 
v. State Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 799 (Me. 1973) (Indigent parents are entitled to 
appointed counsel in a neglect proceeding brought by the state because “the full panoply of the traditional 
weapons of the state are marshalled against the defendant parents.”); see also Donald N. Duquette, Legal 
Representation for Children in Protection Proceedings: Two Distinct Lawyer Roles Are Required, 34 
FAM. L. Q. 441, 441-42 (2000) (“Federal law requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent 
the best interests of the child in child abuse and neglect court cases as a condition to a state’s receiving 
federal child welfare funds.”) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
 48. To know how many things may not change in policy, see Ralph J. Podell, The “Why” Behind 
Appointing Guardians Ad Litem for Children in Divorce Proceedings, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 103, 107 (1973) 
(“Many times the parents, rather than the public, voice objection to or criticism of a guardian ad litem 
appointment and his fee.  This objection has little sound merit.  The child was not brought into this world 
by reason of its own asking but instead by reason of the act or acts of the parents; and neither has the child 
created the dispute that is before the court.”). 
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A.  Qualifications for the Roster 
The Supreme Judicial Court maintains the GAL roster and determines the 
required GAL qualifications, but in 2015 the Legislature proscribed that GALs must 
hold “professional licenses.”49  In 2000, the court created a roster for GALs who met 
certain training criteria, but no specific professional licensure, but allowed the trial 
court to appoint non-rostered GALs.50  With new rules effective September 1, 2015, 
the court required that any GAL, rostered on or after March 1, 2000, must meet 
qualifications established by the court,51 including one of these licensures: 
(i) A current valid license to practice law in the State of Maine; (ii) A current valid 
license to practice as a Licensed Clinical Social Worker (LCSW), Licensed 
Professional Counselor (LPC), Licensed Clinical Professional Counselor (LCPC), 
Licensed Master Social Worker (LMSW), Licensed Marriage Family Therapist 
(LMFT), Licensed Pastoral Counselor (LPaC), psychologist, or psychiatrist in the 
State of Maine; or (iii) A Certification of Qualification by the Director of the CASA 
program, provided that a CASA Certification qualified individual may be appointed 
a guardian ad litem only pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4005.52  
Under this new Rule, GALs rostered after 2000 but who lacked these licenses 
were not grandfathered but could only complete existing appointments.  Effective 
October 1, 2016, and following a period of public comment, the court amended this 
Rule effective to grandfather those GALs who were on the roster before September 
1, 2015, and who were otherwise in good standing and were willing to take the 
training program.53  The Chief Judge of the District Court may not roster any 
professional, except lawyers, who does not meet the licensure requirements.54  And, 
                                                                                                     
 49. 4 M.R.S.A. § 1553(2)(A).  
 50. In Title 22 child protection cases, GALs must be lawyers or court-appointed volunteers.  See 4 
M.R.S.A. § 1501 (2016) (“There is established within the Administrative Office of the Courts of the 
Judicial Department the Court Appointed Special Advocate Program to provide volunteer lay persons to 
serve as court appointed special advocates or guardians ad litem under Title 22, section 4005, subsection 
1, in child abuse and neglect cases.”); 22 M.R.S.A. § 4005(1) (2016) (“The following provisions shall 
govern guardians ad litem.  The term guardian ad litem is inclusive of lay court appointed special 
advocates under Title 4, chapter 31.”); M.R.G.A.L. 2(a)(2) (2016) (“Guardians ad litem appointed in child 
protection proceedings pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4005 shall be either a CASA or an attorney listed on the 
Roster. If neither a CASA nor an attorney from the Roster is available, the court may appoint another 
attorney, provided that the attorney has not been removed or suspended from the Roster, and has not 
surrendered his or her appointment to the Roster.”).  This requirement is not without criticism.  See Ann 
M. Haralambie, Humility and Child Autonomy in Child Welfare and Custody Representation of Children, 
28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 177, 195 (2006) (“Attorneys have the training to investigate, organize, 
and analyze the facts of their cases, to counsel their clients on alternatives, to think creatively about 
solutions, and to advocate positions on behalf of their clients . . . .  But even with that training, attorneys 
do not have the expertise to know what is best for a given child in a given circumstance.”).  
 51. See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1507(2) (2016). 
 52. M.R.G.A.L. 2(b)(2)(A) (2016). 
 53. See M.R.G.A.L. 2(b)(4)(iv) (2016) (“Have been on the GAL roster on the effective date of the 
implementation of these Rules (September 2015), have completed the core training required by these 
Rules, and if the applicant holds professional licenses, be in good standing.”).  
 54. See 4 M.R.S.A. § 1555(1)(A) (2016) (“A court may appoint, without any findings, any person 
listed on the roster.  In addition, when a suitable guardian ad litem included on the roster is not available 
for appointment, a court may, for good cause shown and after consultation with the parties, appoint an 
attorney admitted to practice in this State who, after consideration by the court of all of the circumstances 
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unlike previous versions of the rule, an individual trial judge or magistrate may not 
yet appoint a non-rostered professional who possesses special skills for a particular 
case. 
B.  “Special Concerns” and “Best Interests” 
Under all statutory schema, the “best interest” standard guides the core purpose 
of the GAL appointment:  
[T]o provide information to assist the court in determining the best interests of the 
child involved in the determination of parental rights and responsibilities and 
guardianship of a minor under Title 18-A, in the determination of parental rights 
and responsibilities under Title 19-A, section 904 or 1653, and in the determination 
of contact with grandparents under Title 19-A, section 1803.  The court shall appoint 
a guardian ad litem in a child protection case under Title 22, chapter 1071.55 
Titles 18-A and 19-A adopt a test premised on the court having “special concern 
as to the welfare of a child.”56  In a Title 22 case, the appointment is automatically 
done as a matter of law.57  The purpose of any GAL appointment, to assist the court 
in determining “the best interests of a child,”58 is consistent with the history and role 
of GALs in Maine.59 
Under 4 M.R.S.A. § 1555(2) (2016), the factors listed for granting a GAL 
appointment under Titles 18-A and 19-A are fewer than the lengthy factors under 
                                                                                                     
of the particular case, in the opinion of the appointing court has the necessary skills and experience to 
serve as a guardian ad litem. For the purposes of this paragraph, good cause may include the appointment 
of a guardian ad litem on a pro bono basis.”).   
 55. 4 M.R.S.A. § 1554(1) (2016); see also id. §§ 1555(4), 1556(3); 18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-112(a), (d) 
(2016) (“In any proceeding under this Title for which the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child 
involved in the proceeding, at the time of the appointment, the court shall specify the guardian ad litem’s 
length of appointment, duties and fee arrangements.”); 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1507(4) (2016) (“The guardian 
ad litem shall use the standard of the best interest of the child as set forth in section 1653, subsection 3.”); 
22 M.R.S.A. § 4005(1)(A)-(B) (2016) (“The term guardian ad litem is inclusive of lay court appointed 
special advocates under Title 4, chapter 31 . . . . The court, in every child protection proceeding . . . shall 
appoint a guardian ad litem for the child . . . . The guardian ad litem shall act in pursuit of the best interests 
of the child.”).  
 56. 4 M.R.S.A. § 1555(1) (2016).  
 57. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4005(1)(A) (2016) (“The court, in every child protection proceeding except a 
request for a preliminary protection order under section 4034 or a petition for a medical treatment order 
under section 4071, but including hearings on those orders, shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child.  
The guardian ad litem’s reasonable costs and expenses must be paid by the District Court.  The 
appointment must be made as soon as possible after the proceeding is initiated.  Guardians ad litem 
appointed on or after March 1, 2000 must meet the qualifications established by the Supreme Judicial 
Court.”).  
 58. See M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(5) (2016) (“In performance of duties in Title 18-A and Title 19-A 
proceedings, the guardian ad litem shall use the standard of the best interest of the child as stated in 19-A 
M.R.S. § 1653(3).”); M.R.G.A.L. 4(c)(8) (2016) (“In performing the duties specified in the appointment 
order, the guardian ad litem shall use the standard of the best interest of the child.”).    
 59. See Miller v. Miller, 677 A.2d 64, 69 n.8 (Me. 1996) (“The responsibilities of a guardian ad litem 
are currently embodied in 19 M.R.S.A. § 752-A (Supp. 1995). At the time of the appointment of the 
guardian in this case, however, section 752-A had not been enacted.  Instead, the responsibilities of 
guardians were elaborated in judicial opinions.  According to those opinions, which formed the basis for 
the current statute, a guardian ad litem’s central responsibility is to assist the court in its role as parens 
patriae to determine the best interests of the child(ren).”). 
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19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(3) (Supp. 2015), as amended over the past 30 years or so:60  
 
(1) The wishes of the parties;       
(2)  The age of the child;       
(3)  The nature of the proceeding, including the contentiousness of the hearing;       
(4) The financial resources of the parties;       
(5) The extent to which a guardian ad litem may assist in providing information 
concerning the best interests of the child;       
(6) Whether the family has experienced a history of domestic abuse;       
(7) Abuse of the child by one of the parties; and       
(8) Other factors the court determines relevant.61 
By itself, this does not mean too much but it does mean that the Legislature 
intended to give primacy to these factors but installed sub-paragraph H to allow trial 
courts the flexibility to consider any other relevant factors consistent with prior law.62  
In Title 22 cases, the GAL has a court-defined role which includes much more 
active involvement, by design, with the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) and third party agencies and persons.63  In non-Title 22 cases, the 
appointment of a GAL is not automatic merely because parents are in conflict, but 
must follow a set of legislatively imposed factors designed to assure that the 
appointment is specific and targeted to the needs of that family operating within the 
Family Court Division.  In Title 22 cases, there are few visible statutory changes, 
though federal and state polices concerning reunification and termination have had 
an ebb and flow for decades.  
What does matter for all stakeholders is that the Legislature required a complaint 
process under all three titles and provided very specific directions to the court as to 
the shape and process for complaints:  
1. Rules. The Supreme Judicial Court shall provide by rule for a complaint 
                                                                                                     
 60. For the list of factors, see 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(3) (Supp. 2015). 
 61. 4 M.R.S.A. § 1555(1)(B) (2016); see 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1507(1) (2012) (“The court may appoint 
a guardian ad litem when the court has reason for special concern as to the welfare of a minor child.  In 
determining whether an appointment must be made, the court shall consider: A. The wishes of the parties; 
B. The age of the child; C. The nature of the proceeding, including the contentiousness of the hearing; D. 
The financial resources of the parties; E. The extent to which a guardian ad litem may assist in providing 
information concerning the best interest of the child; F. Whether the family has experienced a history of 
domestic abuse; G. Abuse of the child by one of the parties; and H. Other factors the court determines 
relevant.”).   
 62. Ironically, the short list, with due and proper regard for advances in child abuse and domestic 
violence as public policy and safety for parents and children, still captures the primary factors for assessing 
best interests in most family systems: “We recognize that the phrase ‘best interest of the child’ is abstract.  
Nevertheless this Court has endeavored to give that concept some measure of substantive meaning.” Cyr 
v. Cyr, 432 A.2d 793, 796 (Me. 1981). 
 63. See 4 M.R.S.A. § 1556(2)(D), (E), (F) (2016) (“The guardian ad litem must be provided access to 
the child by any agency or person . . . . The guardian ad litem shall file such reports, motions, responses 
or objections as necessary and appropriate to the stage of the case to assist the court in identifying the best 
interests of the child and provide copies to all parties of record . . . . The guardian ad litem shall appear at 
all child protection proceedings, unless previously excused by order of the court, and other proceedings 
as ordered by the court.  The guardian ad litem may present evidence and ensure that, when appropriate, 
witnesses are called and examined, including, but not limited to, foster parents and psychiatric, 
psychological, medical or other expert witnesses.”).  
2016] THE NEW PHOENIX 83 
process concerning guardians ad litem appointed under Title 18-A, Title 19-A 
and Title 22 that provides for at least the following:    
A. The ability of a party to make a complaint before the final judgment as 
well as after the final judgment is issued;      
B. Written instructions on how to make a complaint;      
C. Clear criteria for making a complaint;       
D. Transparent policies and procedures concerning the investigation of 
complaints and the provision of information to complainants;      
E. A central database to log and track complaints; and      
F. Policies and procedures for using complaints and investigations for 
recommending the removal of a guardian ad litem from a particular case 
or other consequences or discipline.         
2. Complaint process. The division shall provide written and electronic 
information to communicate the complaint process to the public and to all 
parties.       
3. Minor complaint option. The rules may provide for a minor complaint option 
that authorizes corrective action without the necessity of completing the full 
complaint and investigatory process.       
4. Motion to remove. The complaint process adopted pursuant to this section is in 
addition to the right of a party to file a motion to remove the guardian ad litem 
while the case is pending. The court shall hold a hearing on the motion at the 
request of the party filing the motion. The motion may be advanced on the 
docket and receive priority over other cases when the court determines that the 
interests of justice so require.64 
The development of rules and procedures for implementation is a work-in-
progress but the statutory structure guides these future developments. 
C.  The Appointment Order: Type and Scope of Duties 
For GALs, the historical duty was a function of an obligation to the court and 
the ethical and legal obligations which flowed from those activities.65  The enactment 
of GAL legislation in 2013 and the court’s adoption of new GAL Rules effective in 
2015, may shift that duty, and its correlative ethical and legal protections, to a more 
confined, or at least, precise space.  
By way of brief background, in Gerber v. Peters, the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court, sitting as the Law Court, rejected any common law duty between parent and 
GAL on the grounds that an “attorney-client relationship between the appointed 
guardian ad litem and a parent is not created by the court’s appointment or by a 
provision that the parents be responsible for the payment of the guardian’s fees.”66  
The Law Court then held that the duty of a GAL “in a divorce case is to the court, 
                                                                                                     
 64. 4 M.R.S.A § 1557 (2016).  
 65. For a critical analysis that is still relevant, see Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 2, at 259 
(“This confusion about guardian ad litem roles is startling.  It arises in the legal forum where definitions 
are important, precision is a virtue, and role responsibilities are highly regulated. Such precision and 
regulation are essential to provide the parties due process, and are particularly important where the state 
invades families’ constitutional rights of privacy, while addressing the needs of vulnerable minors.  Yet 
when a judge inserts the figure of a guardian ad litem into the case, no consensus as to that figure’s rights 
and responsibilities exists.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 66. 584 A.2d 605, 607 (Me. 1990). 
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and the scope of that duty lies within the parameters of the order of appointment.”67  
The Law Court subsequently held in Kennedy v. State that GALs were 
employees of the state within the meaning of the Maine Tort Claims Act because the 
GAL “has traditionally been viewed as functioning as an agent or arm of the court, 
to which it owes its principal duty of allegiance, and not strictly as legal counsel to 
a child client.”68  Within these functions, a GAL  
[F]ills a void inherent in the procedures required for the adjudication of custody 
disputes. Unhampered by the restrictions that prevent the court from conducting its 
own investigation of the facts, the guardian ad litem essentially functions as the 
court’s investigative agent, charged with the same ultimate standard that must 
ultimately govern the court’s decision – i.e., the “best interest of the child.”69  
Under Titles 18-A and 19-A, and in identical language for Title 22, the scope of 
duties is precisely limited in the negative: “The guardian ad litem has no authority to 
perform and may not be expected to perform any duties beyond those specified in 
the appointment order, unless subsequently ordered to do so by the court.”70  The 
split in the form of appointment occurs because a GAL is an automatic rather than 
discretionary appointment in all child abuse and neglect cases under Title 22.71  In 
child custody cases between private parties, the Legislature and the Law Court 
prescribed two forms of duty: mandatory and optional.72  In a standard appointment 
                                                                                                     
 67. Id.  
 68. 1999 ME 85, ¶ 9, 730 A.2d 1252 (quotation marks omitted); see also In re Nikolas E., 1998 ME 
243, ¶ 10, 720 A.2d 562 (“Because the child is a minor, a guardian ad litem is appointed and either the 
child or the guardian can ask for an attorney to be appointed.  In this case, the guardian is an attorney and 
acts in both capacities.”). 
 69. Kennedy, 1999 ME 85, ¶ 9, 730 A.2d 1252 (quotation and some punctuation marks omitted).   
 70. 4 M.R.S.A. §§ 1555(2)(B), 1556(2)(B) (2016).  
 71. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4005(1)(A) (2004) (“The court, in every child protection proceeding except a 
request for a preliminary protection order under section 4034 or a petition for a medical treatment order 
under section 4071, but including hearings on those orders, shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the child.  
The guardian ad litem’s reasonable costs and expenses must be paid by the District Court.  The 
appointment must be made as soon as possible after the proceeding is initiated.  Guardians ad litem 
appointed on or after March 1, 2000 must meet the qualifications established by the Supreme Judicial 
Court.”).  The GAL Rules do include lay persons acting as CASA volunteers but that is limited to Title 
22 cases so it is not discussed further. M.R.G.A.L. 1(c)(5) (“CASA and CASA Program.  “CASA” means 
a court appointed special advocate, and “CASA Program” means the Court Appointed Special Advocate 
Program established in Title 4, Chapter 31.”).     
 72. 19-A M.R.S.A. §1507(3)(A)(B) (2012): 
A. A guardian ad litem shall: (1) Interview the child face-to-face with or without another 
person present; and . . . (3) Make a written report of investigations, findings and 
recommendations as ordered by the court, with copies of the report to each party and the 
court.  
B. The court shall specify the optional duties of the guardian ad litem.  The optional duties 
of the guardian ad litem may include: (1) Interviewing the parents, teachers and other 
people who have knowledge of the child or family; (2) Reviewing mental health, medical 
and school records of the child; (3) Reviewing mental health and medical records of the 
parents; (4) Having qualified people perform medical and mental evaluations of the child; 
(5) Having qualified people perform medical and mental evaluations of the parents; (6) 
Procuring counseling for the child; (7) Retaining an attorney to represent the guardian ad 
litem in the pending proceeding, with approval of the court; (8) Subpoenaing witnesses and 
documents and examining and cross-examining witnesses; (9) Serving as a contact person 
between the parents and the child; or (10) Other duties that the court determines necessary, 
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order (AO) there are two mandatory duties: (1) interview the parents and child(ren), 
and (2) write a report.73  There are many more optional duties in an expanded order 
so as to provide the court with flexibility relative to each family’s unique strengths 
and limitations.74 What is critically important is that any activities outside the AO 
require an amended AO.75  These very precise silos, as defined under M.R.G.A.L. 
4(a), must be “checked” at the time of original appointment and then amended if the 
authority is not visibly present, together with the fee structure: 
(1) A limited purpose appointment order issued pursuant to Rule 4(b)(4)(D)(i), 4 
M.R.S. § 1555, and either 19-A M.R.S. § 1507 or 18-A M.R.S. § 1-112;76    
(2) A standard appointment order issued pursuant to Rule 4(b)(4)(D)(ii), 4 M.R.S. 
§ 1555, and either 19-A M.R.S. § 1507 or 18-A M.R.S. § 1-112;77   
(3) An expanded appointment order issued pursuant to Rule 4(b)(4)(D)(iii), 4 
M.R.S. § 1555, and either 19-A M.R.S. § 1507 or 18-A M.R.S. § 1-112;78 or  
                                                                                                     
including, but not limited to, filing pleadings.  If, in order to perform the duties, the 
guardian ad litem needs information concerning the child or parents, the court may order 
the parents to sign an authorization form allowing the release of the necessary information.  
The guardian ad litem must be allowed access to the child by caretakers of the child, 
whether the caretakers are individuals, authorized agencies or child care providers. 
 73. See M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(4)(D)(ii) (2016) (“The standard appointment order shall list the duties of the 
guardian ad litem to be performed pursuant to the order.  
(a)  Those duties, in each standard appointment order, shall be:   
(1)  Observing the child or children in the home or homes where the child or children 
regularly reside, and for each child over the age of 3, conducting a face-to-face interview 
with the child;   
(2)  Interviewing each parent and each other adult who resides in the home or homes where 
the child or children regularly reside; and    
(3) Completing and filing a written report of investigation, findings, and recommendations 
as ordered by the court when the case is to proceed to a contested hearing, with copies of 
the report to each party and the court, within the time specified in the appointment order.”)   
 74. See id. 4(b)(4)(D)(iii).  
 75. See M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(4)(D)(iii)(b) (2016) (“If the court orders any additional duties to be 
performed pursuant to the original appointment order or an amendment of that order, the court may amend 
any provision of the prior order that is affected by the newest order.”).     
 76. This type of limited appointment may involve interviewing an adolescent in a relocation case, 
recommending whether a child should testify and under what circumstances, or a safety assessment where 
there are concerns about a home environment, for example.  See M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(4)(D)(i) (2016) (“The 
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a specified, limited purpose or purposes.  The order must specify 
the duties that the guardian ad litem shall perform, the duration of the appointment, the maximum number 
of hours that may be spent on the case by the guardian ad litem, the hourly fee rate, and the maximum fee 
that may be charged by the guardian ad litem.”).   
 77. The standard order under M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(4)(D)(ii)(a)(1-3) includes these duties: (1) observing 
the child or children in the home or homes where the child or children regularly reside, and for each child 
over the age of three, conducting a face-to-face interview with the child; (2) interviewing each parent and 
each other adult who resides in the home or homes where the child or children regularly reside; and (3) 
completing and filing a written report of investigation, findings, and recommendations as ordered by the 
court when the case is to proceed to a contested hearing, with copies of the report to each party and the 
court, within the time specified in the appointment order.   
 78. See M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(4)(D)(iii)(a)(1-10) (2016) (“The original appointment order or an amended 
appointment order may specify any additional duties of the guardian ad litem that shall be individually 
approved by the court.”).  The list is a general safety valve for judges and magistrates to tailor interventions 
or duties unique to a family.  Nevertheless, the expanded AO may include mental health evaluations of 
parents and the child. See M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(4)(D)(iii)(a)(4-5) (“Arranging for and obtaining medical, 
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(4) An appointment order issued pursuant to Rule 4(c), 4 M.R.S. § 1556, and 22 
M.R.S. § 4005.79    
These distinctions require some careful thought as the judicial system and GALs 
move forward.  In the past, GAL duties were a function of the broad scope of the 
best interest standards and rather vague appointment orders – as noted implicitly in 
Gerber.  This is no longer true.  The AO not only must specifically define the optional 
duties, from speaking with therapists, teachers, or family members, but ethical and 
legal immunity may be defined by the scope of the AO and the performance of both 
mandatory and optional duties.  In Title 18-A and 19-A cases, the court has adopted 
rules which require AOs to define the purpose and function of the appointment and 
the scope of duty at the time of appointment.80  In Title 22 cases, the scope of the 
AO and the duties is lengthy and complex, including the development of 
interventions and service plans.81  
The intersection of Title 4 and Rule 4 is critical because, unlike other state 
courts, the Law Court had not originally conferred immunity but in Gerber and 
Kennedy found that there was no duty owed to a parent.82  The explicit provisions of 
Title 4 provide that: 
A person appointed by the court to serve as a guardian ad litem acts as the court's 
agent and is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for acts performed within the scope 
of the duties of the guardian ad litem. As a quasi-judicial officer, the guardian ad 
litem shall perform the assigned duties independently and impartially in all relevant 
matters within the scope of the order of appointment, respecting the court's 
obligation to dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently and fairly as 
provided in the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct.83 
                                                                                                     
educational, or mental evaluations of the child within a time and at a cost to be stated in the order; 
Arranging for and obtaining medical, educational, or mental evaluations of the parents within a time and 
at a cost to be stated in the order.”).  These may be useful but Maine does not have many forensic 
psychologists willing—or trained—to undertake these evaluations and there is typically no private health 
insurance or public funding available in non-Title 22 cases.  The proper use of these evaluations requires 
sensitivity to the ethics and science which underscore parental capacity evaluations.  See Jelena Zumbach 
& Ute Koglin, Psychological Evaluations in Family Law Proceedings: A Systematic Review of the 
Contemporary Literature, 46 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. AND PRAC. 221 (2015).  
 79. See M.R.G.A.L. 4(c) (2016) (“The guardian ad litem has no authority to perform and shall not be 
expected to perform any duties beyond those specified in the appointment order, unless subsequently 
ordered to do so by the court.”).   
 80. In Title 19-A, in particular, the costs and fees are linked.  See M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(4)(A) (2016) (“The 
court shall specify the guardian ad litem’s length of appointment; duties, including the filing of a written 
report pursuant to 4 M.R.S. § 1555(6) and either 19-A M.R.S. § 1507(5) or 18-A M.R.S. § 1-112(e); and 
fee arrangements, including hourly rates, timing of payments to be made by the parties, and the maximum 
amount of fees that may be charged for the case without further order of the court.  The guardian ad litem 
may not perform and shall not be expected to perform any duties beyond those specified in the 
appointment order, unless subsequently ordered to do so by the court.”).     
 81. See M.R.G.A.L. 4(c)(1-9) (2016).  
 82. For an early discussion of this topic, see Dana E. Prescott, The Liability of Lawyers as Guardians 
ad Litem: The Best Defense is a Good Offense, 11 J. AM. ACAD. MATR. L. 65 (1993).  
 83. 4 M.R.S. § 1554(3) (2013).  It is important to read the mandatory lists of duties which coincide 
with immunity.  See 4 M.R.S. § 1554(3)(A-I); see also 19-A M.R.S. § 1507(6) (“A person serving as a 
guardian ad litem under this section acts as the court’s agent and is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for 
acts performed within the scope of the duties of the guardian ad litem.”) (emphasis added). 
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From an ethical perspective, Rule 3 reaffirms this proposition: “[G]uardians ad 
litem are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from liability for actions undertaken 
pursuant to their appointments and these Rules.”84  The point, not to be lost, is that 
the provisions of the new statutes and the new rules are not always consistent or 
easily traversed, but what is clear is that the new paradigm is defined by the scope of 
the AO both as sword and shield.  
D.  The AO and GAL Fees 
With that caveat, the role of the GAL is defined by the limits on hours and fees 
in Titles 18-A and 19-A cases in very specific ways.  Ordinarily, lengthy quotes are 
discouraged in law review articles when lawyers can read the text themselves, but 
this is an unusual situation – to say the least.  The Legislature, the court, GALs, and 
the public were caught in this fray because the costs to families of a GAL in private 
cases was seen as a flashpoint.  This is not the place to debate the myths or truths, or 
describe the commonality among stakeholders if some voices had been more civil 
and others had stopped to listen.  What matters now is the legislation specifically 
requires that any AO must specify that payment for services is the responsibility of 
the parties and the precise terms of payment:   
A. The fee arrangements in the order must specify hourly rates or a flat fee, the 
timing of payments to be made and by whom and the maximum amount of fees 
that may be charged for the case without further order of the court. If the 
payments ordered to be made before the guardian ad litem commences the 
investigation, if any, are not paid as ordered, the guardian ad litem shall notify 
the court, and the court may vacate the appointment order or take such other 
action it determines appropriate under the circumstances.     
 
B. In determining the responsibility for payment, the court shall consider: 
(1) The income of the parties;       
(2)  The marital and nonmarital assets of the parties;       
(3)  The division of property made or anticipated as part of the final divorce 
or separation;       
(4)  Which party requested appointment of a guardian ad litem; and      
(5)  Other factors considered relevant by the court, which must be stated with 
specificity in the appointment order.          
 
C. The guardian ad litem shall use standardized billing, itemization requirements 
and time reporting processes as established by the division. The guardian ad 
litem may collect fees, if a collection action is necessary, pursuant to Title 14 
and may not pursue collection in the action in which the guardian ad litem is 
appointed.85 
 Consistent with this statute, the Rules provide that in Title 18-A proceedings, 
                                                                                                     
 84. See M.R.G.A.L. 3; see also Dalton v. Dalton, 2014 ME 108, ¶9, 99 A.3d 723 (“Judicial immunity 
protects a GAL from civil liability for acts performed within the scope of a GAL’s official duties in the 
event that he or she is personally sued.”); McNally v. Mokarzel, 386 A.2d 744, 746 (Me. 1978) (“Public 
officials are immune from civil liability for quasi-judicial decisions within the scope of their authority 
without regard to bad faith, malice or other evil motives.”).  
 85. 4 M.R.S. § 1555(3) (2016).  
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the court “shall specify who is responsible for payment of the guardian ad litem’s 
fees.”86  In Title 19-A cases, the AO must be specific as to all arrangements.87  The 
AO must set a maximum fee and “direct that a specified sum be paid within a set 
time before the guardian ad litem commences the investigation and any interim 
payments, with the remainder to be paid within 14 days after the filing of the written 
report.”88  As for expanded AOs, “the appointment order shall specify a maximum 
fee, direct that a specified sum be paid within a set time before the guardian ad litem 
commences the investigation, direct the payment of any interim payments, and 
require that the remainder be paid within 14 days after the filing of the written 
report.”89 
For judges and magistrates, this means that vague orders concerning role, duty, 
or fees not only fail to comply with statutory authority but may expose GALs to a 
lack of immunity.  For practitioners, aggressive behaviors—or spinning for clients—
concerning GALs who decline to take action that exceeds the scope of the AO is 
inappropriate.  What remains unclear, and may for some time as the system adapts 
to these new standards, is the scope of any implied authority. A few common 
examples of this tension may help:  
1. The AO directs the GAL to interview both parents but makes no mention of 
third persons like grandparents.  The pleadings suggest that a third person is 
engaging in corporal punishment.  The mother wants the GAL to interview 
potential witnesses and her parents during the home visit.  Yes or no?  
2. The AO directs the GAL to interview the children’s therapist who 
communicates regularly with the parents’ therapists.  Father’s lawyer wants the 
GAL to review the therapeutic records of both parents.  Mother’s lawyer agrees 
and the lawyers agree in emails to these interviews and records.  Yes or no? 
3. The AO directs the GAL to prepare an interim report for mediation but does 
not direct the GAL to attend mediation (or judicial settlement conference) and 
there are no more hours or fees left.  May the GAL attend mediation as 
demanded by the attorneys?  Yes or no? 
Like most things legal, lawyers could debate each scenario by splitting 
intentions from common sense from the actual language of the AO.  What should not 
be forgotten is that only the GAL has risk.  The lawyers, acting as advocates may 
push or prod to self-protect from the demands of a client but that means much less 
than the consequences to GALs who tread off the AO path.  What is co-extensive 
within each of these scenarios is the requirement in 18-A and 19-A cases that, at the 
time of the appointment, the court shall specify the length of appointment, duties and 
fee arrangements,  
                                                                                                     
 86. M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(4)(C) (2016). 
 87. M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(4)(A) (2016) (“The court shall specify the guardian ad litem’s length of 
appointment; duties, including the filing of a written report pursuant to 4 M.R.S. § 1555(6) and either 19-
A M.R.S. § 1507(5) or 18-A M.R.S. § 1-112(e); and fee arrangements, including hourly rates, timing of 
payments to be made by the parties, and the maximum amount of fees that may be charged for the case 
without further order of the court.  The guardian ad litem may not perform and shall not be expected to 
perform any duties beyond those specified in the appointment order, unless subsequently ordered to do so 
by the court.”).    
 88. M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(4)(D)(ii)(b) (2016).  
 89. M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(4)(D)(iii)(c) (2016) (emphasis added).  
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[H]ourly rates, timing of payments to be made by the parties, and the maximum 
amount of fees that may be charged for the case without further order of the court.  
The guardian ad litem may not perform and shall not be expected to perform any 
duties beyond those specified in the appointment order, unless subsequently ordered 
to do so by the court.  
This is non-negotiable. During public hearings, the Legislature, and the Law 
Court were  sensitive to complaints about the vagueness of the authority exercised 
by GALs, as well as the cost of GAL services.90  As structured under the law, any 
work beyond the AO may be performed voluntarily, even if implied, but is unlikely 
to be compensated.  Whether a GAL should accept appointments with the promise 
of future payments or with the requirement that, upon notice from the GAL, the court 
may order sanctions or vacate the order, is a very complex conundrum for the GAL.  
Payment of fees and the struggle over the perception of who pays can be perceived 
as bias and can harm rapport, a delicate enough balance for a GAL in many cases.  
Whatever that future may bring, fees and the hours are critical components of any 
AO under Rule 4.  
E.  Timing of the Appointment 
In “contested proceedings under sections 904, 1653 and 1803 in which a minor 
child is involved, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the child. The 
appointment may be made at any time, but the court shall make every effort to make 
the appointment as soon as possible after the commencement of the proceeding.”91  
In its adoption of Rules for non-Title 22 matters, the court specifically provided that 
any motion or request to the court for appointment of a guardian ad litem: 
[S]hall be filed no later than the conference with the court following the first 
scheduled mediation session or, if mediation is waived, 60 days after the first 
conference with the court.  A motion or request for appointment of a guardian ad 
litem may be considered at a later time only if the court finds that:  
 
(A)   There is good cause for the late motion;  
(B)   The reasons for the late motion could not have been anticipated at a point when 
a timely motion could have been filed; and  
(C)  The appointment will not unreasonably delay resolution of the matter or harm 
the best interest of the child in achieving clarity in parental rights and 
responsibilities for the child.92 
This matrix requires that all three factors be met for late GAL appointments. 
Subparagraphs A and B are typical of many rules.  Subparagraph C has a disjunctive 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Douglas v. Douglas, 2012 ME 67, ¶24, 43 A.3d 965 (“Although the statute, 19-A M.R.S. § 
1507(7) (2011), requires that, in determining responsibility for payment of GAL fees, the court consider 
the parties’ income, assets, and other factors, the court’s opinion gives no indication that the court 
considered these statutory factors in concluding that the parties share the expenses equally. At oral 
argument, responding to a question from this Court, counsel for Lisa advised that, at the time the additional 
fees were assessed, Lisa was of limited means and receiving MaineCare assistance for her and her son.”).  
 91. 19-A M.R.S. § 1507(1) (2016); see also Me. R. Civ. P. 107(a)(2) (interim motion for appointment 
of GAL).  These rules are consistent with the statute; though the GAL Rules are the more specific source 
in the event of a conflict as to timing.  
 92. M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(2) (2016) (emphasis added). 
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which generates a new test in the second part: the court must find the absence of 
“harm” in “achieving clarity” in the parental rights and responsibilities.  The origin 
of this phrase is unknown, but it actually frames the inverse-test for appointing a 
GAL rather well.  As a matter of current practice, it is reasonable to anticipate that 
the time limits will be strictly enforced, so plan accordingly.  
In fairness, it is often more difficult to predict the need for a GAL in an original 
proceeding (or the need may be mitigated by mediation or parent education or other 
intervention).  Conversely, in post-judgment relocation or modification cases, where 
a child is older and may express a meaningful preference, or a change in primary 
residence or access arrangements is necessitated by substantial changes in the lives 
of the parents, it is easier to predict that need.93  This is one of those situations which 
will have to await the development of practice standards which could very well vary 
from county to county.  
F.  The Preferences of a Child 
What is mandatory in terms of a duty irrespective of the type of appointment 
under Titles 18-A or 19-A is that the GAL “shall make the wishes of the child known 
to the court if the child has expressed them, regardless of the recommendation of the 
guardian ad litem.”94  As an aside, and if I may be afforded a brief segue, there is an 
explicit provision in Rule 4(c) which I originally missed pertaining to Title 22 but 
which should be part of Rule 4(b)(4)(D):  
Protection of Child as Witness. The guardian ad litem shall advocate for the interests 
of the child when the child is called to testify as a witness in any judicial proceeding 
relating to the case in which the guardian ad litem has been appointed. The guardian 
ad litem may advocate for special procedures, including, but not limited to, special 
procedures to protect the child witness from unnecessary psychological harm 
resulting from the child’s testimony.95   
In Maine, child-witnesses are technically treated like any other witness under 
the rules of evidence in terms of competency and admissibility in civil proceedings.96  
There is no empirical data on this point, but a pass through courthouse hallways and 
anecdotal discussions among bench, bar, and other interdisciplinary professionals 
                                                                                                     
 93. See Jackson v. Macleod, 2014 ME 110, ¶ 22, 100 A.3d 484 (“To determine whether a substantial 
change has occurred, the court must ask (1) whether there has occurred a change in circumstances that has 
a sufficiently substantial effect on the children’s best interests to justify a modification of the prior order, 
and (2) if so, how the court should modify the custody arrangement in furtherance of the children’s best 
interests . . . . The purpose of the substantiality requirement “is to prevent disappointed parents from 
bringing repeated motions to modify divorce decrees” and ‘“shopping’ for a judge who will revise the 
order.”) (citations omitted).  
 94. 4 M.R.S. § 1555(5) (2013); 4 M.R.S. § 1556(4); M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(6).  In title 22 matters, there is 
no such explicit provision because the statutory duties are different.  See M.R.G.A.L. 4(c)(1).  
 95. M.R.G.A.L. 4(c)(5) (2016). 
 96. See State v. Roman, 622 A.2d 96, 100 (Me. 1993) (“A child of any age is presumed competent to 
testify as a witness unless disqualified under [Me. R. Evid.] Rule 601(b).”); State v. Murray, 559 A.2d 
361, 362 (Me. 1989) (in holding five-year-old sex abuse victim competent to testify, court relied on child’s 
statements that “she knew what lies were and that those who told them were punished”); see also 
Hutchinson v. Cobb, 2014 ME 53, ¶14, 90 A.3d 438 (“All testimonial proceedings in any family or civil 
matter must be recorded.”).  
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yields the observation that more parents are bringing children to court for family 
court docket calls.  Given the volume of self-representation in Maine, the younger 
range of pre-school and elementary school children experiencing parental separation, 
and the duration and intensity of parental conflict over years, it is likely that judges 
and magistrates may have to utilize a limited appointment more often, and even on 
the court’s own motion.97  This is particularly true in circumstances when a child 
may have language barriers, disabilities, or vulnerabilities from the conflict or other 
traumatic events.98  In this very way, the court is acting in the most meaningful and 
historical sense of its parens patriae obligations. 
What is deeply troubling about the mandated language in Title 4 is that the 
language does not leave room for discretion or safety or threats of violence or 
oppression or duress or age or any other factors.  The operative word is “shall” and 
the only test is that the child “has expressed them.”99  For decades, at common law 
and by statute, the duty to consider the “preference of the child, if old enough to 
express a meaningful preference” could be described both in legal language and in 
the language of therapists and psychologists as a function of cognitive, emotional, 
and environmental factors.100 
One concern is that good people, with the best of intentions, may not appreciate 
the kinds of thought-patterns which enter the minds of parents in these cases.  Most 
lawyers, judges, therapists, and GALs have heard a parent say that the four-year-old 
does not want overnights, for example.  Moreover, children may survive by telling 
each parent what he or she wants to hear, and this may influence what children reveal 
to GALs and judges as well.101  Sometimes a GAL may take that responsibility from 
the child by telling the child that the recommendation rests with the GAL, and the 
decision with the trial court.  The point is that there is more subtlety and 
protectiveness in the “meaningful preference” language than a blunt absolute duty 
than may be safe and appropriate for children caught between feuding parents.  
                                                                                                     
 97. See, e.g., Villa v. Smith, 534 A.2d 1310, 1312 (Me. 1987) (“The District Court declined to 
exercise its power under Me. R. Evid. 706(a) to appoint an independent expert witness to make a 
psychological examination of the children.  The advisers’ note to Me. R. Evid. 706(a) declares that the 
trial judge’s power to appoint an independent expert ‘should be resorted to only in exceptional situations.’  
Child custody decisions are consigned to the discretion of the trial court, and the District Court did not 
abuse that discretion by refusing to appoint a child psychologist to interview young children concerning 
their attitudes toward a future move.”) (citations omitted).  
 98. See, e.g., State v. Marroquin-Aldana, 2014 ME 47, ¶¶ 41-42, 89 A.3d 519 (“[I]t is an unquestioned 
principle that a defendant must be afforded the means to understand the proceedings against him.”) 
(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 5 M.R.S. § 51 (2013); M.R. Crim. P. 28; Guidelines for 
Determination of Eligibility for Court-Appointed Interpretation and Translation Services, Me. Admin. 
Order JB-06-3 (as amended by A. 7-13) (effective July 16, 2013).       
 99. M.G.A.L.R. 4(b)(6) (2016) (“The guardian ad litem shall make the wishes of the child known to 
the court if the child has expressed them, regardless of the recommendation of the guardian ad litem.”).  
 100. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(3)(C) (Supp. 2015).  The same language may be found in the Grandparents 
Visitation Act, 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1803(3)(C) (2012).   
 101. Karen Saywitz, Lorinda B. Camparo & Anna Romanoff, Interviewing Children in Custody Cases: 
Implications of Research and Policy for Practice, 28 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW 542, 545 (2010) 
(“There is also very little scientific research on the effects of expressed preference on children’s post-
divorce adjustment. Clearly, further research with children is needed to understand both positive and 
negative effects of participation versus non-participation, participation in different types of judicial 
procedures, and expressed preferences on children’s well-being.”).  
92 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1 
Perhaps a variation on Rule 4(c)(5) and the approach in Title 22 cases toward the use 
of children’s voices may be applied to 18-A and 19-A cases in the future.102 
G.  Submission of Reports 
For many decades now, a GAL’s duty to the court was to provide an objective 
and independent investigation of facts and a report which may include 
recommendations concerning the allocation of parental decision making, primary 
residence, or forms of visitation and access.103  Under § 1507(5), a GAL “shall make 
a final written report to the parties and the court reasonably in advance of the hearing.  
The report is admissible as evidence and subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, 
whether or not objected to by a party.”104 
The Law Court has held that due process is served by the right to cross-examine 
the GAL, and contest the report.105  As it held more than a decade ago, 
We have addressed similar hearsay and due process issues in opinions approving 
the admission of statutorily authorized guardian ad litem or DHHS reports in divorce 
proceedings. Thus, there is no question that the Legislature may authorize court 
consideration of the contents of guardian ad litem reports as an exception to the 
hearsay rule. The real issue is whether the court’s consideration of the information 
in these reports violates due process rights.106  
The court then rejected a due process violation for reasons that apply to few 
other forms of evidence in the American judicial system: 
The law provides other safeguards to reduce the risk of untrustworthy information 
affecting the court’s decision. First, the guardian ad litem is a disinterested party 
and an agent of the court. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4005(1)(G). The guardian ad litem must 
meet court established qualification requirements in order to serve, 22 M.R.S.A. § 
4005(1)(A), and therefore possesses competence and experience to make reasoned 
judgments about the reliability of information. Second, the guardian ad litem is 
                                                                                                     
 102. See supra notes 93, 98. 
 103. See Coppersmith v. Coppersmith, 2001 ME 165, ¶ 4, 786 A.2d 602 (“Given the extensive history 
of conflict between the parents and the age of Kevin (ten) and Jennifer’s age (twelve), the District Court 
needed an objective and independent investigation into the interests and desires of the Coppersmiths’ 
children, and did not abuse its discretion in appointing a guardian ad litem.”); Richards v. Bruce, 1997 
ME 61, ¶ 10, 691 A.2d 1223 (“The guardian serves as the court’s agent and prepares a report for the court 
detailing his or her findings. 19 M.R.S.A. § 752-A(4) and (5). The guardian ad litem’s duties can include 
interviewing, subpoenaing, and examining witnesses and parties, reviewing mental health and other 
medical records, and procuring counseling and evaluation services for the child and parents. The 
guardian’s report offers the court a compendium of information that aids the court in determining the best 
interests of the child.”).   
 104. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1507(5) (2016). 
 105. See Wechsler v. Simpson, 2016 ME 21, ¶17, 131 A.3d 909 (“We have noted that ‘the most 
effective challenge to the quality, completeness, or competence of a guardian ad litem’s work will be 
accomplished through cross-examination of the GAL at trial.’  Adoption of T.D., 2014 ME 36, ¶ 18, 87 
A.3d 726.  Here, at the hearing before the referee, Simpson had an opportunity to cross-examine the 
guardian ad litem on any and all aspects of his recommendations.  The referee was then responsible for 
evaluating the guardian ad litem’s testimony, which had been subject to challenge on cross-examination, 
to determine the weight she felt it deserved. Neither the evidentiary process nor the referee’s treatment of 
the guardian ad litem’s report and recommendations was affected by error.”).  
 106. In re Chelsea C., 2005 ME 105, ¶ 10, 884 A.2d 97 (internal citations omitted). 
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statutorily required to provide copies of the report and the names of sources to all 
parties in advance of trial. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4005(1)(D). Further, nothing precluded 
the mother from calling a declarant to testify, or producing a witness of her own to 
rebut the challenged statements.107  
In the enabling legislation, the timeline for the report is more precise, but there 
are possible inconsistencies. Under 4 M.R.S.A. § 1555(6) (2016), in title 18-A and 
19-A cases, a GAL:  
[S]hall provide a copy of each report ordered by the court to the parties and the court 
at least 14 days before each report is due.  A guardian ad litem shall provide a copy 
of the final written report to the parties and the court at least 14 days in advance of 
the final hearing. Reports are admissible as evidence and subject to cross-
examination and rebuttal, whether or not objected to by a party. Any objections to a 
report must be filed at least 7 days before the applicable hearing.108  
The Probate Code, however, provides that “[i]f required by the court, the 
guardian ad litem shall make a final written report to the parties and the court 
reasonably in advance of a hearing. The report is admissible as evidence and subject 
to cross-examination and rebuttal, whether or not objected to by a party.”109  In 
similar language for Title 22 cases, a GAL  
[S]hall make a written report of the investigation, findings and recommendations 
and shall provide a copy of the report to each of the parties reasonably in advance 
of the hearing and to the court, except that the guardian ad litem need not provide a 
written report prior to a hearing on a preliminary protection order. The court may 
admit the written report into evidence.110  
Although it is unwise to suggest as a matter of routine that rules trump statutes, 
it may be   preferable to follow the rules or request a more specific date from the 
court.  In 18-A and 19-A appointments, M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(7) expressly provides that 
a GAL “shall provide a copy of any required final written report to the parties and 
the court at least 14 days in advance of the final hearing. The report is admissible as 
evidence and subject to cross-examination and rebuttal, whether or not objected to 
by a party.”111  In Title 22 cases, M.R.G.A.L. 4(c)(6) provides that  
[F]or interim or preliminary protection hearings, the guardian ad litem should, 
except as otherwise required, appear in court and offer recommendations subject to 
questions by the court and parties or counsel. The submission of a report by the 
guardian ad litem and the admissibility of any such report in evidence shall be as 
provided by statute. The guardian ad litem may present evidence at court 
hearings.112  
H.  Rule 5 and Specific Standards of Conduct 
The standards of conduct contained in M.R.G.A.L. 5(a)-(j) are much more than 
                                                                                                     
 107. Id. ¶ 14 (emphasis added). 
 108. 4 M.R.S.A. § 1555(6) (2016). 
 109. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-112(e) (2012).  
 110. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4005(1)(D) (2004). 
 111. M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(7) (2016).  
 112. M.R.G.A.L. 4(c)(6) (2016).  
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just a punch list.  For the practitioner or self-represented litigant, these Rules are also 
not merely guidelines from which someone may pick and choose.  Rule 5 is intended 
to provide the GAL with a critical framework to serve the judicial system and 
families.  And it is always the court which weighs the impact and weight of any 
testimony or report, or the ongoing role of the GAL relative to any child.113  Because 
these sections contain some unique differences from past practices, a brief analysis 
of each follows. 
Performance of Duties: A GAL “must maintain independent representation of 
the best interest of the child and perform the guardian ad litem’s duties faithfully.”  
The importance of this sentence is that it does not alter the court’s holdings or the 
new statute which maintain a primary duty to the court.  Nevertheless, the operative 
terms “independent” and “faithfully” are the touchstone for the GAL’s relationship 
to the child as an officer of the court.  Conduct which may impede those touchstones, 
or requests by counsel or a parent, must be carefully guarded against.114  Yet these 
objectives need not be seen as rigid or unforgiving.  The art of professional discretion 
and judgment, not perfection, still creates space for performance of these duties.  
  Agent of the Court: “As a quasi-judicial officer, the guardian ad litem shall 
exercise his or her independent judgment on behalf of the child in all relevant 
matters, respecting the court’s obligation under Canon 2.2 of the Maine Code of 
Judicial Conduct to ‘perform all judicial and administrative duties promptly, fairly, 
and competently.’”115  The court wisely adopted a rule which has long-standing 
parameters but its application to GALs will await future development.116 
Develop Understanding of Litigation: Commencing upon appointment, a GAL 
                                                                                                     
 113. See In re Adoption of T.D., 2014 ME 36, ¶ 18, 87 A.3d 726 (“Indeed, often the most effective 
challenge to the quality, completeness, or competence of a guardian ad litem’s work will be accomplished 
through cross-examination of the GAL at trial.  If a parent or other interested party has filed a motion to 
remove the GAL or otherwise challenging the GAL’s investigations, the court can, and should, hear the 
motion during the trial and allow examination of the GAL on the pertinent issues.  If the court concludes 
that the investigation has been insufficient or that the GAL has demonstrated a bias that has made the 
GAL’s testimony unreliable, the court may disregard that testimony in whole or in part.”). 
 114. Michael J. Beloff, Neither Cloistered nor Virtuous? Judges and their Independence in the New 
Millennium, 15 DENNING L. J. 153, 155-56 (2012) (“From the very nature of their function springs the 
very imperative for their independence. But we take it as axiomatic that our judiciary not only should be, 
but are independent – by which we mean broadly that the judges approach cases before them, untainted 
by any interest in their outcome, free from any outside pressure to reach a decision in a particular way, 
and excluding from their consideration, so far as is humanly possible, any of those prejudices which are 
the product of class, race, gender, or genes.”). 
 115. M.G.A.L.R. 5(b) (2016); see also Me. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.2 (“A judge shall uphold and apply 
the law, and shall perform all judicial and administrative duties promptly, fairly, and competently.  An 
error of law in a judicial decision, whether recognized on appeal or not, shall not constitute a violation of 
this Code unless the judge’s action demonstrates willful or repeated disregard of explicit requirements of 
the law.”).    
 116. See Samsara Mem’l Trust v. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman, 2014 ME 107, ¶ 24, 102 A.3d 757 
(“We take this opportunity to further define the standards for judicial recusal and disclosure in Maine, 
where the legal and judicial communities are small and lawyers and judges necessarily know one another 
and enjoy cordial and professional relationships.  We also reaffirm that the responsibility to promote and 
preserve the integrity of the legal system is shared by members of the judiciary and the bar alike.”); 
Charette v. Charette, 2013 ME 4, ¶ 23 n.3, 60 A.3d 1264 (“Other courts have recognized that a judge’s 
casual acquaintances or social relationships do not result in automatic disqualification, particularly when 
the judge sits in a small community, as many Maine judges do.”). 
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should, “to the extent reasonably possible, considering the resources authorized for 
the guardian ad litem,” engage in the following duties:  
(1) Obtain copies of all relevant pleadings and notices; (2) In Title 22 cases, unless 
excused by the court, and in Title 18-A and 19-A cases, when directed by the court, 
participate in depositions, negotiations, and discovery that are relevant to the child’s 
best interest, and participate in all case management, pretrial or other conferences, 
and hearings, unless excused by the court; (3) Confirm the appointment with the 
clerk’s office.  The clerk shall send copies of all subsequent notices and orders to 
the guardian ad litem. Parties or their counsel shall send to the guardian ad litem 
copies of all pleadings and correspondence with the court, and the guardian ad litem 
shall be entitled to reasonable notification of case conferences, changes of 
placement, and other changes of circumstances affecting the child and the child’s 
family; (4) Not cause case delays and shall attempt to reduce case delays; and (5) 
Include parties in the investigation, employ effective communication techniques, 
and be sensitive to the culture and socio-economic status of the parties.117   
Subsections 1, 3, 4, and 5 are important aspects of conducting the GAL role with 
accurate information and respect for diversity in communications and investigations.  
Subsection 2, however, poses a dilemma.  As discussed previously, Title 22 has an 
express provision which requires GAL attendance at critical phases of a child 
protection case.  Thus, a judge must affirmatively excuse a GAL from participation 
in various phases of Title 22 litigation.118  
Some of that, of course, is that the State, not the parties, is compensating the 
GAL so the judge controls the time and fees.  In comparison, the second clause 
concerning Title 18-A and 19-A cases is written in the conjunctive: (1) only when 
directed by the court must a GAL attend “depositions, negotiations, and discovery 
that are relevant to the child’s best interest”; but (2) rather than and “participate in 
all case management, pretrial or other conferences, and hearings, unless excused by 
the court.”119  Despite the language of the first clause, the second clause has the same 
“unless excused” language as Title 22 cases.  
The conundrum is that the current standard AO does not include that duty as 
mandatory and the extended AO only includes that duty if the judge orders the GAL 
to attend.120  Once again, the specific hours and costs authorized for the GAL must 
be given primacy under these new rules.  Under the caption (developing 
understanding of litigation) is not the most obvious place to put a duty that is 
mandatory unless excused.  Another reason for a prudent pause is that the first clause 
uses the term “negotiation” which may mean mediation, informal settlement 
conferences, or judicial settlement conferences.  None of these events in child 
custody litigation are listed in the second clause.   
At this juncture in the development of these rules and procedures, it is prudent 
for judges and magistrates to build in hours for these costs and to be clear in AOs as 
                                                                                                     
 117. M.G.A.L.R. 5(c) (2016). 
 118. See M.G.A.L.R. 4(c)(4) (2016) (“The guardian ad litem shall appear at all child protection 
proceedings to represent the child’s best interest, unless previously excused by order of the court, and at 
other proceedings as ordered by the court.”).  
 119. M.R.G.A.L. 5(c)(2) (2016).  
 120. See 19-A M.R.S.A. §1507(3)(A)(B) (2012); M.G.A.L.R. 4(D)(iii)(a)(10) (2016) (“Other duties 
that the court determines necessary, including, but not limited to, filing pleadings and testifying in court.”).  
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to which specific events the GAL is expected to attend.  For GALs, any questions 
should be resolved before a critical event (and that may mean what the parents think 
is critical, not what lawyers or GALs think they know) with a letter to the court.  It 
is prudent for GALs not to delay asking the court to clarify the duties under Rules 4 
and 5.  In addition, GALs may not wish to accept the agreement of lawyers or parties 
(even if in writing and with the best of intentions) as the scope and duties in an AO.  
The duty not to cause delay in proceedings is, however, co-extensive with the duty 
of clerks and counsel to assure that relevant calendar notices are promptly sent to the 
GAL.121  
Explanation of Court Process: “When appropriate, the guardian ad litem shall 
explain the court process and the role of the guardian ad litem to the child.  When 
necessary, the guardian ad litem shall assure that the child is informed of the purpose 
of the court proceeding.”122  The predicates for these two sentences (when 
appropriate/when necessary) actually present a rather difficult preference/choice 
matrix for which there is little ethical or research guidance.  Implicit, of course, is 
that this judgment requires an understanding of the developmental age and maturity 
of the child.123  That is often rather easy to assess.  
Assuming that the GAL is trained to interview a child at all, these requirements 
become more difficult when there is domestic violence, known or unknown trauma 
from abuse or neglect, emotional manipulation and pressure, or characterological or 
mental health deficits which may harm the child once the GAL leaves the home 
environment.  Parents and third parties too frequently coerce the content of the 
interview or the questions asked by the GAL and then may blame or criticize the 
child for failing to follow the script.  Or worse, on occasion, though it is perfectly 
understandable, the child tells each parent what he or she wants to hear but tells the 
GAL something different.  
How to manage that information when parents demands that the GAL explain 
why the GAL is “lying” because their son/daughter said that was not what he/she 
said after reading the report to the child during dinner?  And this ethical and legal 
conundrum is co-extensive with when and whether communications with a child are 
confidential under Rule 5(g): 
The guardian shall exercise reasonable discretion about whether to disclose 
communications made by the child to the court, or to professionals providing 
services to the child or the family based on the guardian ad litem’s evaluation of the 
best interest of the child.  Any decision by the guardian not to disclose such 
                                                                                                     
 121. See M.G.A.L.R. 5(c)(3) (2016) (“The clerk shall send copies of all subsequent notices and orders 
to the guardian ad litem. Parties or their counsel shall send to the guardian ad litem copies of all pleadings 
and correspondence with the court, and the guardian ad litem shall be entitled to reasonable notification 
of case conferences, changes of placement, and other changes of circumstances affecting the child and the 
child’s family.”); M.G.A.L.R. 5(c)(4) (2016) (“Not cause case delays and shall attempt to reduce case 
delays.”).  
 122. M.G.A.L.R. 5(d) (2016).  
 123. Karen Saywitz et al., Interviewing Children in Custody Cases: Implications of Research and 
Policy for Practice, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 542, 542 (2010) (“Research on child interviewing has burgeoned 
over the past 25 years as expectations about children’s agency, competence, and participation in society 
have changed.  Across diverse fields of study, researchers have been investigating how best to elicit 
information from children about their experiences, preferences, perceptions, sensations, attributions, 
thoughts, and feelings[.]”). 
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information, however, shall be subject to review by the court following an in camera 
review.124 
The term “evaluation” is much more a clinical assessment than a judgment of a 
GAL balancing harm and benefit within the paradox of an adversarial system which 
places a child at the center of conflict by imposing fact-finding by trial.125  
Moreover, context matters because the cognitive development and verbal 
statements of a child may be quite different than observed body language, affect, or 
mood (e.g. anxiety expressed as hands moving or eyes flitting, stilted words that are 
memorized like a speech, language that is not age-appropriate to describe a 
parent).126  Although there is no Confrontation Clause right in civil child custody 
cases, Due Process does provide parents with the right to offer testimony of material 
witnesses, including a child.127  Given the stressors for children, coupled with 
cognitive and emotional limitations, it is likely that judges in the future will need to 
appoint GALs, in a limited capacity, to interview and recommend a means for child 
testimony and to recommend a means to hear testimony from a child with minimal 
trauma when the child has been forced into court by one or both parents.128 
                                                                                                     
 124. M.G.A.L.R. 5(g) (2016) (emphasis added).  
 125. For a valuable article that makes many of these arguments, see Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the 
System to Protect Children in High Conflict Custody Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL L.  REV. 495, 499 (2001) 
(“Other proposals, however, involve changes that can be made in the existing system to provide services 
to parents embroiled in a custody dispute.  Judges, lawyers, and mental health professionals are the 
principal professionals with the greatest power to influence the course of a custody case.  These 
professionals can develop new collaborative models that will more effectively identify and resolve the 
vast majority of high-conflict custody cases.”).  
 126. See BENJAMIN D. GARBER, DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR FAMILY LAW PROFESSIONALS: 
THEORY, APPLICATION, AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 56 (2010) (“Above and beyond 
understanding the typical course of language development, the family law professional must be acutely 
attuned to how a particular child’s language skills might facilitate or impede a genuine understanding of 
his or her wishes, needs, and experience with regard to the family.”); see also SUSAN R. HALL & BRUCE 
D. SALES, COURTROOM MODIFICATIONS FOR CHILD WITNESSES: LAW AND SCIENCE IN FORENSIC 
EVALUATIONS 22 (2008) (“To fulfill their responsibilities, GALs have the power to investigate and present 
the court with recommendations regarding the child and provide support to the child throughout the legal 
process.”). 
 127. See Jusseaume v. Ducatt, 2011 ME 43, ¶ 12, 15 A.3d 714 (“When significant rights are at stake, 
due process requires: notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and 
present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidence, and an impartial fact-finder.  Because due 
process guarantees the right to respond to evidence, an adjudicator must afford a party the opportunity to 
rebut or challenge evidence offered against him or her.”) (internal citations omitted); In re Priscilla S., 
1997 ME 16, ¶ 2, 689 A.2d 593 (“The court may interview a child witness in chambers, with only the 
guardian ad litem and counsel present, provided that the statements made are a matter of record.”).  
 128. See, e.g., In re E.A., 2015 ME 37, ¶¶ 13-14, 114 A.3d 207 (“The Confrontation Clause provides 
that ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.’ This right does not extend to civil matters, however. The due process to which a parent in a 
child custody proceeding is entitled does not rise to the same level as that accorded the defendant in a 
criminal prosecution.’  Child protection proceedings, although ‘deserving of more elaborate procedural 
safeguards than are required for the determination of lesser civil entitlements’ due to the ‘constitutional 
dimension’ of the right to parent are nonetheless civil matters.  The Confrontation Clause therefore does 
not apply in child protection proceedings.”) (internal citations omitted); State v. Fischer, 238 A.2d 210, 
211 (Me. 1968) (“Before testimony was heard from the three complaining children the justice conducted 
a lengthy examination of each child to ascertain that child’s competence to testify.  The justice was 
thorough, patient and resourceful in testing the understanding of each child.”). 
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What this will mean in the context of this specific ethical Rule remains to be 
seen if the appointment is more than limited and is intended to invoke all the other 
duties, including recommendations for primary residence and access arrangements 
when the child is told by both parents (at younger and younger ages) that he or she 
“gets to choose.”129  These risk factors arise even more frequently in post-order 
motions to modify primary residence.  In circumstances in which risk factors for the 
child are present or coaching and interrogation are plausible, it is prudent for GALs 
to notify the court of the decision not to explain the proceedings or inform the child 
of the specific role of the GAL.  In such cases, it is also likely that the GAL may 
need to link that explanation to the duty to advise the court of the child’s expression 
of “wishes,” but in a biosocialpsycho context.130  
Advocate for Clear Court Orders: The GAL “should request orders that are 
clear, specific, and, where appropriate in Title 22 cases, include a time line for the 
assessment, implementation of services, placement, treatment, and evaluation of the 
child and the child’s family.”131  The GAL role is an organic process. No one will 
know all the facts which exist at the time of appointment, and no one will know 
whether an intervention like mediation or parent education will resolve what looks 
like a chronic conflict case.  Prediction and labeling early in cases is, in fact, quite 
inappropriate for experts, GALs, and other professionals.  These forms of 
confirmatory bias invade cases in ways which lead to the wrong intervention, may 
ignore the complex relationship of domestic violence to a child’s statements or a 
parent’s behavior, or distort the investigation and recommendations.132 
At this point in time, however, there are structural issues within the Maine 
judicial system which require internal change.  Maine is one of the states which lacks 
single-judge case management in child custody cases.133  Magistrates are often more 
available for motions or conferences than district court judges in some counties, and 
clerks’ offices do their best within current staffing and workloads to be responsive 
to GAL requests. But the lack of resources—even with skilled management by the 
court administrators—cannot manufacture resources or alter an eight-hour day when 
                                                                                                     
 129. See 19-A M.R.S.A. §1653(3)(C) (Supp. 2015) (“The preference of the child, if old enough to 
express a meaningful preference.”). 
 130. See M.R.G.A.L. 4(b)(6) (“The guardian ad litem shall make the wishes of the child known to the 
court if the child has expressed them, regardless of the recommendation of the guardian ad litem.”); see 
generally William V. Fabricius & Linda J. Luecken, Postdivorce Living Arrangements, Parent Conflict, 
and Long-term Physical Health Correlates for Children of Divorce, 21 J. OF FAM. PSYCHOL. 195, 
202 (2007) (“The divorce literature has almost exclusively focused on psychological outcomes, but 
modern biopsychosocial models allow us to hypothesize and explore relations to physical health.”). 
 131. M.G.A.L.R. 5(e) (2016).  
 132. See James R. Flens, The Responsible use of Psychological Testing in Child Custody Evaluations: 
Selection of Tests, 2 J. OF CHILD CUSTODY 3, 5 (2005) (“It also requires evaluators to consider sources of 
bias that may affect interpretation of test results, including evaluator biases such as confirmatory bias, 
confirmatory distortion or ‘psychotic certainty,’ and test-taker bias (e.g., response styles including 
impression management and self-deceptive enhancement.”)) (internal citations omitted).  
 133. Richard C. Boldt & Jana B. Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches: Problem-Solving Judges and 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Drug Treatment Courts and Unified Family Courts, 65 MARYLAND L. REV. 
82, 84 (2006) (“Unified family courts, by contrast, reflect the joint efforts of state legislators, 
administrators, and court officials to cope with burgeoning caseloads and demands for services brought 
on by significant changes in family structure and in the legal doctrines applicable to divorce and parenting 
disputes.”).  
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courts are open to the public.  
More than likely, the explicit demand of the Rules “to govern and define the 
services provided by guardians ad litem to the court and to promote the best interests 
of the children whose interests they are appointed to represent” and that the Rules 
“shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action” may require the assignment of a specific judicial officer to review these 
requests in each county.134  In counties in which many more litigants are self-
represented, judicial oversight and case management responsive to GAL requests, 
consistent with Rule 1(b), are crucial because delay can increase risk of harm, and 
GALs can no longer act without judicial authority without risk.   
Mandated Reporting: Under Maine’s GAL Rules,  
Pursuant to 22 M.R.S. §4011-A, while acting in their professional capacity as 
guardians ad litem, guardians ad litem are mandated reporters, and if a guardian ad 
litem knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been or is likely to 
be abused or neglected, the guardian ad litem shall make an immediate report to the 
Department of Health and Human Services.135  
Mental health professionals are much more familiar with this duty than lawyers, 
but that by itself does not mean that the duty to report is not a complex analysis in 
many cases involving children and ongoing child custody disputes.136  
What matters is that lawyers acting as GALs are not lawyers for purposes of any 
privilege beyond confidentiality as proscribed by these Rules.137  Instead of the 
attorney-client privilege which may insulate lawyers from mandated reporting, 
lawyers as court-appointed GALs must comply with this rule and statute.138  Before 
leaving this section, and recognizing that GALs in Maine are multi-disciplinary, 
mandated reporting and role clarity arises whenever a GAL may be tempted to 
voluntarily help too much or become aligned with one side.139  
Confidentiality: A GAL shall: 
observe all statutes, rules, and regulations concerning confidentiality.  A guardian 
ad litem shall not disclose information or participate in the disclosure of information 
relating to a case to any person who is not a party to the case, except as necessary to 
                                                                                                     
 134. M.R.G.A.L. 1(b) (2016).  
 135. M.G.A.L.R. 5(f) (2016).  
 136. See Seider v. Board of Examiners of Psychologists, 2000 ME 206, ¶ 37, 762 A.2d 551 (“The 
Board also concluded that Seider twice violated Sections III(E)(8) and III(I)(1) of the AASPB Code. The 
Board first found that Seider violated these provisions by failing to report to DHS her suspicions of the 
sexual abuse of the children “immediately,” as prescribed by 22 M.R.S.A. § 4012.  It also found that she 
violated the provisions by neither having a sufficient knowledge of the reporting requirements, nor of the 
DHS reporting procedures.”) (internal footnotes omitted).  
 137. See M.R.G.A.L. 5(g) (“If the guardian ad litem is an attorney, she or he shall be deemed to act as 
a guardian ad litem rather than as an attorney, and information he or she receives is not subject to the 
attorney-client privilege.”).    
 138. For a discussion of the evolution of these tensions, see Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting 
Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L. 
J. 203 (1992).  
 139. Seider, 2000 ME 206, ¶ 23, 762 A.2d 551 (“By creating the 51-page explanation, in which she 
divulged detailed evaluations of the daughter, made clinical diagnoses regarding the mother and the son, 
and offered extensive recommendations regarding how DHS should proceed with its investigation, Seider 
went over and beyond what was asked for in the DHS subpoena.”).   
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perform the guardian ad litem’s duties, or as may be specifically provided by law or 
by these Rules.140  
This is a very complex rule in terms of practice and policy, but it does provide 
more clarity for the court and for GALs than existed under prior rules or statutes.  As 
a means to deconstruct the rule itself, albeit briefly, each sentence may be bullet 
pointed, as follows:  
•  A guardian ad litem shall observe all statutes, rules, and regulations concerning 
confidentiality.   
•  A guardian ad litem shall not disclose information or participate in the 
disclosure of information relating to a case to any person who is not a party to 
the case, except as necessary to perform the guardian ad litem’s duties, or as 
may be specifically provided by law or by these Rules. 
•  Communications made to a guardian ad litem, including those made to a 
guardian ad litem by a child, are not privileged.   
•  The guardian shall exercise reasonable discretion about whether to disclose 
communications made by the child to the court, or to professionals providing 
services to the child or the family based on the guardian ad litem’s evaluation 
of the best interest of the child.   
•  Any decision by the guardian not to disclose such information, however, shall 
be subject to review by the court following an in camera review.   
•  A guardian ad litem’s notes and work papers are privileged and shall not be 
disclosed to any person, reserving to the court, however, the authority to order 
disclosure of such material as part of court proceedings, if the court determines 
that disclosure is warranted under applicable court procedures.  
•  If the guardian ad litem is an attorney, she or he shall be deemed to act as a 
guardian ad litem rather than as an attorney, and information he or she receives 
is not subject to the attorney-client privilege. 
“Observation of all statutes, rules, and regulations concerning confidentiality” 
raises a variety of tensions between laws like HIPAA and the rights of children, 
particularly adolescents.141  This is not a topic which has received much discussion 
at GAL trainings.  There are traps aplenty in this area, however, for GALs 
irrespective of professional licensure.  This is particularly true when there are issues 
of substance abuse or reproductive rights because that confidentiality implicates an 
even more complex body of law.142  
                                                                                                     
 140. M.R.G.A.L. 5(g).  
 141. See Abigail English & Carol A. Ford, The HIPAA Privacy Rule and Adolescents: Legal Questions 
and Clinical Challenges, 36 PERSP. ON SEXUAL REPROD. HEALTH 80, 81 (2004) (“Over the past several 
decades, adolescents have gained many opportunities to receive confidential health care services, 
particularly for concerns related to sexual activity, pregnancy, HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases 
(STDs), substance abuse and mental health.  From both a clinical and a public policy perspective, 
protection of confidentiality for adolescents has been based on recognition that some minors would not 
seek needed health care if they could not receive it confidentially, and that their forgoing care would have 
negative health implications for them as well as society.”). 
 142. See Claude Schleuderer & Vicky Campagna, Assessing Substance Abuse Questions in Child 
Custody Evaluations, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 375, 376 (2004) (“However, an additional informed consent is at 
least potentially necessary when investigating substance abuse allegations.  This is because of federal 
regulations and rules that preempt any state statute, specifically Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulation 
(CFR) Part 2 (Statutory Authority for Confidentiality of Drug Abuse Patient Records, 2004).  This 
regulation requires explication of different standards for informed consent.  The intent of this law is to 
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Given that communications are not privileged when acting as a GAL, this first 
provision in the rule may be read in conjunction with the duty of nondisclosure to 
non-parties.  The “exercise of reasonable discretion” as to whether to disclose 
communications from the child to any person or service provider may require access 
to the court for in camera review.  The model that has proven effective, but which 
may require more judicial resources, is found in 22 M.R.S. § 4008 and its optional 
and mandatory disclosure requirements.143  
Given the lack of guidance in this area and the complex intersection of federal 
and state privacy laws,144 prudence suggests that careful releases be drawn with an 
explanation of the scope of informed consent and the absence of confidentiality for 
parent or child.  The records themselves (and whether to have records in the 
possession of the GAL at all) encourages prior judicial definition of what may be 
shared with lawyers or parents.145  Too many clinical therapists turn over records to 
GALs even with releases without realizing that in a child custody case both parents 
may see the notes about the other or the child.146  
If conversations or interviews with medical or mental health providers or 
therapists occur, for example, then under the last sentence in Rule 5(g), the “notes 
and work papers are privileged and shall not be disclosed to any person, reserving to 
the court, however, the authority to order disclosure of such material as part of court 
proceedings if the court determines that disclosure is warranted under applicable 
court procedures.”  This Rule is akin to conventional work-product protections which 
are not a function of privilege but the policy admonition that the thoughts and 
impressions of a lawyer are not subject to discovery or cross-examination.147  This 
                                                                                                     
provide a high level of confidentiality for clients who seek drug and alcohol treatment so that their 
disclosures in treatment cannot harm them.”). 
 143. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 4008(1) (2016) (“All department records that contain personally identifying 
information and are created or obtained in connection with the department’s child protective activities and 
activities related to a child while in the care or custody of the department, and all information contained 
in those records, are confidential and subject to release only under the conditions of subsections 2 and 
3.”). 
 144. See Bonney v. Stephens Memorial Hosp., 2011 ME 46, ¶ 17, 17 A.3d 123 (“Although we have 
not previously addressed the issue of whether HIPAA authorizes a private cause of action, all courts that 
have decided this question have concluded that HIPAA does not provide a private cause of action.”).  
 145. See Richards v. Bruce, 1997 ME 61, ¶¶ 4-5, 691 A.2d 1223 (“In an effort to respond to Bruce’s 
concerns, the court offered to review the guardian’s notes in camera to evaluate their relevance to the 
hearing.  Bruce objected to such a review.  The court then offered to hear the guardian’s testimony before 
ruling on the admissibility of his notes.  The court gave Bruce ample opportunity to examine the guardian 
about the information he gathered for his report, including the potential bias of any witnesses with whom 
the guardian spoke.”) (footnote omitted). 
 146. For a thoughtful and thorough review of the delicate balance between privileges for therapeutic 
treatment and the court’s duty to children, see Amy J. Amundsen, Balancing the Court’s Parens Patriae 
Obligations and the Psychologist-Patient Privilege in Custody Disputes, 28 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL 
LAW 1 (2015).  
 147. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1014 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Our 
adversarial system of justice cannot function properly unless an attorney is given a zone of privacy within 
which to prepare the client’s case and plan strategy, without undue interference.”); Rancourt v. Waterville 
Urban Renewal Auth., 223 A.2d 303, 304-05 (Me. 1966) (“It forbids discovery of a written statement 
taken by or for an attorney in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial unless the court otherwise 
orders to prevent injustice or undue hardship. This reflects the holding of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Hickman v. Taylor . . . but is broader than that holding.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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tension will, however, require judicial oversight for the foreseeable future, with the 
in camera mechanisms developed in 22 M.R.S. § 4008 providing the best guidance 
for GALs and lawyers.  
Ex Parte Communications:  This Rule shares common themes with the Judicial 
Canons but also recognizes the unique factors relevant to family law practice, child 
custody litigation, and the role of the court: 
In extraordinary circumstances involving matters of child safety or similarly grave 
concerns, the guardian ad litem may initiate or participate in ex parte 
communications with the court about a particular case pursuant to Canon 2.9(A) of 
the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct. However, as a matter of due process and 
fundamental fairness, the guardian ad litem or the court must promptly disclose the 
nature of the communication to the parties or their counsel, unless such disclosure 
is likely to present a risk of harm to the child or a party, in which case the court shall 
take such steps as are necessary to alleviate the potential for harm, and when the 
danger of harm no longer exists, disclose the nature of the communication to the 
parties or their counsel.148  
A plausible argument could be made that judges, magistrates, and GALs have 
not made as much good use of this exception when appropriate.  Although the phrase 
“extraordinary circumstances” has application to other rules and laws, its usage is 
intended to assure that duties to the child are the paramount consideration.149  Thus, 
this Rule is clear: ex parte communications must promptly become a part of the 
                                                                                                     
 148. M.R.G.A.L. 5(h).  Under Me. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.9(A)(1-5): “A judge shall not initiate, 
permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside 
the presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter, except as follows:   
(1) Where circumstances require it, ex parte communication for scheduling, administrative, 
or emergency purposes, which does not address substantive matters, is permitted, provided:   
(a) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural, substantive, 
or tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication; and   
(b) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the substance 
of the ex parte communication and gives the parties an opportunity to respond.   
(2) A judge may obtain the written advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable 
to a specific proceeding before the judge, if the judge gives advance notice to the parties 
of the person to be consulted and the subject matter of the advice to be solicited, and affords 
the parties a reasonable opportunity to object and respond to the notice and the advice 
requested.   
(3) A judge may consult with court staff and court officials whose functions are to aid the 
judge in carrying out the judge’s adjudicative responsibilities, or with other judges, 
provided the judge makes reasonable efforts to avoid receiving factual information that is 
not part of the record, and does not abrogate the responsibility personally to decide the 
matter.   
(4) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their 
lawyers in an effort to settle matters pending before the judge. 
(5) A judge may initiate, permit, or consider any ex parte communication when expressly 
authorized by law to do so.” 
 149. See Samsara Mem’l Tr. v. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman, 2014 ME 107, ¶ 34, 102 A.3d 757 
(reviewing subjective and objective tests but independent of “these principles governing judicial recusal 
is the requirement of disclosure set out in Canon 3(E)(3), which provides as follows: Unless a judge 
disqualifies himself or herself under subsections (1) or (2) of this section, a judge shall promptly disclose 
to the parties in any proceeding any fact known to the judge that is relevant to the question of impartiality 
and that the judge knows or reasonably ought to know could connect the judge . . . to any of the parties, 
counsel, witnesses, or issues in the proceeding”). 
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record, with adequate notice to counsel or self-represented litigants.  When the 
balance-of-risk test is implicated it should be sufficiently plain but documentation 
for the GAL is critical.  
Conflicts of Interest and Mandatory Disclosures: M.R.G.A.L. 5(i), and, 
concomitantly, Rule 6 concerning involuntary removal are important to understand 
before accepting an appointment.150  There are essentially six sub-categories under 
this Rule: Mandatory Disqualification, Disclosure of Prior Acquaintances, 
Allegations of Failure to Disclose Prior Acquaintances, Duty to Report, Disclosure 
of Other Cases, and Disclosure of Financial Relationship.  In fairness, and unlike 
judges or magistrates in Maine, there are many more GALs on the roster than judges 
and magistrates (even accounting for rural parts of the state with fewer rostered 
GALs).  As the Law Court recently held: 
Applying these Canons of the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct to the present case 
requires an understanding of the practice of law in Maine, where the legal and 
judicial communities are small. It is unavoidable, and indeed desirable, that judges 
who serve on the bench together will necessarily develop close professional 
relationships. We do not expect that such cordial relationships will end if a judge 
leaves the bench and returns to the practice of law. We are cognizant that the party 
status of the law firm in this instance makes this case somewhat different from those 
where a former colleague is simply an advocate for a party before the court. 
However, it remains a "fact of litigation in small Maine communities that a judge, 
or members of his or her family, may know of a party, or a witness, or someone 
related to a party or a witness, or may even have done business with somebody 
whose name may come up in a case.”151 
What Rule 5(i) makes clear is that disclosure, even in camera, is prudent.  Now 
this does not mean that all conflicts are foreseeable.  Any GAL with experience has 
taken a case and then realized at a later meeting or from intake forms that a former 
client is now living with Parent A and is a material witness.  Practicing law over an 
extended period of time makes it more likely that parents have relationships with 
former clients or adversaries from past cases in which confidential knowledge or 
opinions expressed were so strident or relevant as to implicate the “appearance of 
impropriety.”  Therapists, social workers, or psychologists, may discover that they 
conducted clinical diagnosis or assessment of a related family member, step-child, 
or served as an expert witness in a collateral proceeding with DHHS, for example.  
What the Rules do require is prompt disclosure to a judge or magistrate when the 
conflict may reveal itself.   
An additional difficulty may arise when a GAL is asked to provide an interim 
report, for example, and a dissatisfied parent or lawyer then files a motion for 
removal or an ethical complaint with the Review Board.  There is a risk that this type 
of motion practice becomes a strategic ploy which distracts and detracts from the 
merits rather than a good faith exercise of rights under these rules.  Eventually, courts 
may have to balance such motion practice with long-standing precedent applicable 
                                                                                                     
 150. Under M.R.G.A.L. 6(e), the “decision whether to remove a guardian ad litem from a particular 
case is not subject to interlocutory review.”     
 151. Samsara, 2014 ME 24, ¶¶ 35-36, 102 A.3d 757 (footnote omitted). 
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to other types of cases:  
A motion for disqualification should come at the 'earliest moment after knowledge 
of the facts' that suggest recusal. When a party fails to make a timely motion for 
recusal before the entry of judgment, that party has forfeited its objection to the 
judge's qualification and cannot be heard to complain following a result alleged to 
be unfair. "The rationale for this rule is obvious: A party should have no incentive 
to roll the dice for a favorable decision and then, if the decision is unfavorable, raise 
grounds for recusal of which she or [her] counsel had actual knowledge prior to the 
decision being made."152 
For GALs, it may be prudent to decline the appointment, disclose promptly any 
potential conflicts to the parties and counsel in writing, and communicate any new 
potential conflicts which implicate Rule 5(i) to the court without delay and in writing.  
As a result of the potential for misuse and interference with the judicial process under 
Rule 5(i), effective October 1, 2016, the court clarified Rules 6(b) and 6(g) by 
requiring that a parent moving for removal of a GAL shall state whether a complaint 
was filed with the Board.153  Concomitantly, a “complaint submitted to the Review 
Board by a party in an open proceeding shall not proceed until the court issues a final 
judgment in that case, the court enters an order allowing the Board to proceed, or the 
guardian ad litem is removed or discharged.”154 
Withdrawal:  A GAL may also seek to withdraw by filing a motion with the 
court that appointed the GAL but must continue representation until the motion is 
granted, or, if the order so provides, serve until some successor GAL is appointed.155  
This provision is self-explanatory.  Any motion to withdraw should be carefully 
drawn so as to avoid prejudicing a parent or placing a child at risk.  For example, if 
a fee is unpaid despite a court order or both parties or counsel have said that they do 
not want a GAL now because the case has settled, stating those facts is rather 
straightforward.  In other circumstances, such as when a GAL may be threatened or 
a lawyer has behaved in a manner which crosses over from advocacy to bullying, a 
motion to withdraw may be better presented to the judge or magistrate in camera.  
This procedure has been approved by the Law Court in circumstances when the risk 
of public disclosure may harm a case or client.156  
IV.  THE LAST POINT: INVESTIGATOR OR (AND) EXPERT? 
What is hopefully apparent by this point is that the new statutes and GAL rules, 
                                                                                                     
 152. Id. ¶ 25 (citation omitted). 
 153. M.R.G.A.L. 6(b) (“Any such motion shall state whether a complaint has been filed with the 
Review Board pursuant to Rule 9.”).  
 154. M.R.G.A.L. 6(g). 
 155. M.R.G.A.L. 5(j).  
 156. See, e.g., Blessing v. Dow Chem. Co., 521 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Me. 1987) (“Where, as here, ample 
notice of the intent to withdraw was given, neither the client nor opposing party objected to the 
withdrawal, no motions of substance were pending before the court, and no certain date for trial had been 
set, the court should have held an in camera hearing to determine the validity of the assertions if it was 
unable to accept the conclusory representations of the Attorneys concerning the breakdown of the 
attorney-client relationship. Only if the representations of counsel concerning the complete breakdown of 
the attorney-client relationship are not accepted by the court and upon hearing, in camera, are found not 
to be substantiated, should the motion to withdraw be denied.”).  
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as deconstructed and heavily footnoted above, bind together to mitigate GAL role 
confusion. There is, however, a gap which remains a policy quasar: lots of heat, lots 
of blinding light, and lots of energy expended but not much of a scientific explanation 
as to why.  Although I was not particularly prescient, in my 2014 article I wrote that 
if: 
GALs are an integral part of providing a court with an independent expert opinion 
about children, then the next step is to develop criteria for practice and training 
consistent with the intertwined definitions of lay and expert opinion.  The 
development of such standards should transparently consider the unique policy and 
institutional needs and burdens that govern child custody conflict.  These standards 
should also apply across professional disciplines and licensure so that courts more 
precisely understand the limitations of expert prediction and opinion in this specific 
environment.157  
This article will not regurgitate that argument.158  GALs wear many hats which 
cannot be easily reconciled by law or rules when children are vulnerable and parents 
in such conflict as to lose sight of their “better angels.”159  What matters here is that 
the statutes and rules render a GAL report, even before commencement of a trial, 
substantive evidence without distinguishing qualifications, factual investigation, 
personal values, or the foundation for an expert opinion.  This is not about the weight 
of the evidence but the admissibility of the report as policy per se and then testing 
that substantive evidence exclusively through cross-examination.160 
A lay person may not ordinarily give an opinion based upon hearsay or 
knowledge acquired other than through the five human senses.161  That a GAL is 
often called upon to make recommendations that connect a factual investigation with 
personal opinion which may link reliable and relevant evidence-informed research—
or nonscientific concepts—for allocating parental rights and responsibilities is hardly 
                                                                                                     
 157. Prescott, supra note 1, at 67. 
 158. See Prescott, supra note 1, at 61-67.  
A.  159. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS, (Monday, March 4, 1861) (“I am 
loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends.  We must not be enemies.  Though passion may have 
strained it must not break our bonds of affection.  The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every 
battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell 
the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.”).  
 160. Cf. Maietta v. International Harvester Co., 496 A.2d 286, 293 (Me. 1985) (“Ternent relied upon 
the testimony of the drivers and Densmore, as well as, his own knowledge of air brakes and computerized 
anti-locking devices.  His testimony was admissible at trial.”); In re American Board of Com'rs for Foreign 
Missions, 66 A. 215, 231, 102 Me. 72 (1906) (“We should hesitate, however, to say that this defect in the 
chirography of the testator was evidence of any greater decay than that which may be attributed, in many 
instances, to the weakness incident to approaching old age.  It needs no expert to inform us that the hand 
may tremble and the sight may fail long before the mind is deprived of its mental grasp.”); Woodman v. 
Dana, 52 Me. 9, 13 (1860) (“Whether a witness is or is not an expert is a question to be settled, in the first 
instance, by the Court, on a preliminary examination for that purpose. The value or weight of his testimony 
may be tested, after he is admitted, by an examination into the grounds or reasons for any opinion which 
he may express.”). 
 161. See Me. R. Evid. 701; Emery Waterhouse Co. v. Lea, 467 A.2d 986, 992 (Me. 1983) (In general, 
a lay opinion does not meet the standard of Rule 701 if it is “not rationally based wholly and solely on the 
perceptions [the witness] acquired through his personal observations.”).    
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news in any jurisdiction.162  Much of that data, of course, which connects the GAL 
investigation to the recommendations, are drawn from third party statements 
(hearsay), child custody or psychological evaluations, therapists, mental health, 
school, or medical records, and the statements of lay persons or professionals.163 
The reason for this grounding at the end of this article is that, unlike other 
standards for expert testimony, the GAL report and its contents, as a matter of statute 
and rule, not the court as gatekeeper, determines threshold “reliability.”164  The 
“reliability” test, enunciated by the Law Court in State v. Williams165 and explicated 
upon in Tolliver v. Dep’t of Transp.,166 holds that: 
To be admissible, the expert must be able to provide some insight beyond the kind 
of judgment an ordinarily intelligent juror can exert. The qualification of an expert 
witness and the scope of his opinion testimony are matters within the discretion of 
the trial court.  We have established a two-part test, originally articulated in State v. 
Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978), for determining when expert testimony is 
admissible: A proponent of expert testimony must establish that (1) the testimony is 
relevant pursuant to M.R. Evid. 401, and (2) it will assist the trier of fact in 
understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.  Further, to meet the two-
part test, the testimony must also meet a threshold level of reliability. . . . [B]ecause 
if an expert’s methodology or science is unreliable, then the expert’s opinion has no 
probative value.167  
Thus, the opinion of GALs on ultimate issues of fact, like recommendations for 
a parenting plan—irrespective of professional licensure or training—is borne of a 
special family court expert DNA, even if the qualifications or scientific reasoning 
are threadbare or would not meet admissibility standards in any other legal context.  
Unlike other forms of civil litigation, however, the Legislature established an 
                                                                                                     
 162. See Lidman & Hollingsworth, supra note 2, at 258 (“For example: a guardian ad litem-lawyer 
may offer to the court her own observations and personal opinions as evidence via a report and 
recommendation, in effect performing the testimonial function of a witness; a lay guardian ad litem-
investigator may express an opinion on who should get custody as if he were an expert witness, or may 
make an argument at a motion hearing, performing a function reserved to a lawyer or pro se party; and a 
lay guardian ad litem may tell the children their conversations will be confidential, thereby asserting a 
privilege limited to attorney-client relationships.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 163. Care must be exercised when extrapolating too much blame on a failure to focus on family 
resilience, or other variables which may influence outcomes.  See Michael B. Donner, Tearing the Child 
Apart: The Contribution of Narcissism, Envy, and Perverse Modes of Thought to Child Custody Wars, 23 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 542, 544 (2006) (“Although there are a number of dynamic variables that 
may contribute to high-conflict divorces, in this article I describe only those situations in which narcissism, 
pathological envy, disavowal, and perverse thinking all combine to create a mode of thinking and living 
that sustains some of these never-ending battles.”); Michael Friedman, The So-Called High-Conflict 
Couple: A Closer Look, 32 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 101, 105 (2004) (“While our legal system exacerbates 
the conflict inherent in divorce, it is inaccurate and unfair to place all the responsibility with the system 
and its practitioners.  Clients sign off on their own motions.  False and incendiary accusations are 
ultimately the responsibility of the parent making them, not the parent’s attorney, some of whose other 
clients may not be engaging in this kind of tactical warfare.  Sometimes a parent is quite willing to have 
a champion go forth to destroy the other parent.”).  
 164. See In re Sarah C., 2004 ME 152, ¶ 11, 864 A.2d 162 (“To meet the two-part standard for the 
admission of expert testimony, the testimony must also meet a threshold level of reliability.”).  
 165. 338 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978). 
 166. 2008 ME 83, 948 A.2d 1223.   
 167. Id. ¶¶ 28-29 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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exception for GALs for various policy reasons, including   the need to manage and 
decide a high volume of child custody or child abuse cases.  In concrete terms, for 
example, this may mean a recommendation about primary residence or visitation, the 
functional capacity of a parent who has a substance abuse problem or disability, 
overnights for an infant or toddler, how old is too old to force visitation, or whether 
relocation away from one parent is in the best interests of a child.   
The operative policy question, distinct from all other areas of law, is whether a 
rostered GAL, irrespective of professional discipline or experience, should be an 
expert witness about that family by virtue, alone, of roster status and statute.  If GALs 
are to be an integral part of providing a trial court with an independent expert opinion 
about the best interests of a child, then the next step is to develop criteria for practice 
and training consistent with expert opinions premised upon reliable science.  This 
framework may better assure that expert means expert and not just value-laden 
opinion by even the most well-meaning professionals.  The statutes and rules enacted 
or adopted in Maine since 2013 are a foundation for refining and developing 
institutional and professional practices which more effectively protect children and 
assist the court.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
To accomplish the ethical duties required by these new laws and rules, in real 
time and within the bounds of real disputes, requires respect for the unique 
institutional needs and burdens that govern child custody conflict, as well as the need 
to expeditiously and effectively protect children caught in the throes of conflict.  An 
outcome premised on science and evidence requires stakeholder collaboration and 
professional respect that honors competence and integrity but which is not amputated 
by weariness from disparagement or personal assaults.  Vaporizing the better angels 
to appease the most vocal constituencies will not help the many and, certainly, will 
not help this next generation of children.  
Although the court is the repository of conflict between parents who cannot 
resolve those differences privately, this does not mean that professionals and 
decision makers are bound to accept these choices as an inevitable outcome for a 
child.  Given that these are high-stakes cases for families, the judicial system has an 
overarching duty to protect the integrity of the process of investigation and opinion.  
That task is easily criticized when parents offer a truth within the confines of a court 
system overwhelmed and under-resourced.  What may be fairly drawn from all sides 
of this juridical equation is that the absence of organizational and policy research, 
over decades now, has compromised the ability to transparently explain the 
“efficacy” of GALs or any other intervention, including mediation or psychological 
evaluations—among a litany of other judge-imposed interventions—to the public.168  
                                                                                                     
 168. See Werner Bussmann, Evaluation of Legislation: Skating on Thin Ice, 16 EVALUATION 279, 290-
91 (2010) (“Second, due to their scope and complexity, statutes cannot be evaluated according to the ‘gold 
standard’ of evaluation.  This is not a free pass for purely impressionist assessments. Having no strict 
standards does not mean that any standard should be abandoned.  We would argue for a strategy aimed at 
furnishing plausible arguments for decision-makers at the appropriate moment.  Evaluation needs to be 
interwoven with the legislative process more closely than it has been up to now.”).  An exception for 
research seems to be drug courts, but there are reasons why this is ethically and methodologically easier 
to study than child custody or abuse cases in family courts.  See Ojmarrh Mitchell et. al., Assessing the 
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To properly perform such a policy function requires rigorous, comprehensive, 
and sophisticated qualitative and quantitative research over different timelines and 
within the host environment of the family courts, not a lab or classroom.169  There 
are unavoidably complex ethical dilemmas in human-subject research when parents 
and children are vulnerable, exposed to outcomes by judges bound by Judicial 
Canons which constrain discussion of pending cases, or lawyers are bound by a duty 
of zealous advocacy as agents for clients and officers of the court.170  In the 
meantime, however, if it is perceived, often quite accurately, that anecdotal reports 
or institutional convenience or private economic resources guide the quality and 
availability of interventions in family courts, then public confidence, fairly or not, 
will continue to erode.  This statement, for those who read to the end, may seem 
melodramatic.  I wish that were true. But it really is not. 
 
                                                                                                     
Effectiveness of Drug Courts on Recidivism: A Meta-Analytic Review of Traditional and Non-traditional 
Drug Courts, 40 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 60 (2012).  
 169. See Carol S. Bruch, Sound Research or Wishful Thinking in Child Custody Cases? Lessons from 
Relocation Law, 40 FAM. L. Q. 281, 297 (2006) (“Many recent articles on the topic of child custody law 
in legal, interdisciplinary, and even scientific journals contain serious misstatements of the research 
literature.  Unfortunately, the judges, lawyers and legislators who are their intended audience often lack 
statistical or scientific training and are unfamiliar with the scientific literature.”); Benjamin D. Garber, 
Attachment Methodology in Custody Evaluation: Four Hurdles Standing Between Developmental Theory 
and Forensic Application, 6 J. OF CHILD CUST. 38, 45 (2009) (“The leap from validation within research 
samples to validation among forensic samples is complicated for any instrument (Lamb, 2005).  At the 
broadest level, research with court-involved populations demands rigorous attention to relevant legal and 
ethical (APA, 2002, standard 8.02 Ethics) mandates regarding informed consent, data collection, coding, 
storage and publication and the use of experimental methods.”).  
 170. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-adversarial Lawyering, 27 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 153, 154 (1999) (“Too much of the debate about professionalism, it seems to me, has been 
clustered around a series of false dichotomies or polarizations—business versus profession, client defense 
(zeal) versus truth, adversarialism versus compromise, criminal versus civil, public versus private, client 
service and autonomy vs. justice, individualism vs. system, rules of law and discretion—as if our actual 
practices do not often combine aspects of these claimed opposites simultaneously.”).  I cannot resist—
well, I could but will not—borrowing an apt historical analogy from Professor Menkel-Meadow: 
In a recent book examining adversarial ethics (and finding them wanting), Arthur Isak Applbaum 
acknowledges the ethics of professional function (and suggests these can go too far) by recounting the 
ability of Charles-Henri Sanson in maintaining his position as Executioner of Paris through changes in 
regime from Louis XVI through all the stages of the French Revolution, because of his extreme 
professional and functional ethics—he was simply a professional executioner and the underlying political 
regime for whom he did his work did not matter.  What did matter was how and with what professional 
standards of quality he performed his work.  I want to suggest the danger of Sanson’s success – the 
assumption in our own code of legal ethics, that a lawyer is a lawyer and that all lawyers can be regulated, 
by the same rules, regardless of how or for whom they perform their services. 
Id. at 156 (footnotes omitted).  
